The art of life is a constant readjustment to our surroundings

OKAKURA KAKUZO
This year, as I reflect on our work and the articles we have published, I find it hard to identify a single unifying theme that encapsulates the global mood in retail. In many ways, it feels as if we have reached a transition point between two important periods. As discussed in previous editions, the story of retail is the story of the rise and fall of different concepts, formats, and channels. New models emerge and pressure the incumbents of the day, the market adjusts, and a new retail landscape results. Good examples of this type of shift have included the rise of supercenters in North America and hypermarkets in Europe.

In this edition of the Retail Journal, we include our thoughts on tactical opportunities to improve the capabilities underpinning success in retail. For our focus, though, we have chosen this year to look to the future to help us understand where the next upheaval is likely to come from. It often takes very little overall sales pressure to push a business to the point where the return on incremental capital investments in stores becomes negative, and further spending only serves to destroy value. This is an uncomfortable truth, particularly in the case of bricks-and-mortar retail. And it is the start of a long, slow death spiral.

Your personal bête noire will vary by market and by sector. In food retail at least, there is one emerging competitive threat that is apparent, and we have paid much attention to it. German-style hard discounters have continued to make inroads in an increasingly broad range of geographies, and must now be seen as a critical long-term strategic threat. Their transformation of the German retail landscape has been clear. But their impact and often spectacular success over the past few years in new markets, most recently in the UK, is an object lesson. Once discounters break through the credibility barrier with consumers, they can become close to unstoppable.

The underlying economics of the discount format are so compelling that the strongest discounters will almost certainly seek to enter every significant market. Like all disruptive formats, the fact that the economic model is so different makes it extremely difficult for established businesses to respond in anything but a ruinously expensive way. So important is this development that we devote three articles to the topic. In one of them, we discuss the threat that hard discounters pose to established grocers in the American market. In another, a veteran of the German discount wars shares front-line experience and lessons learned. Finally, we identify the discounter threat as one of the key drivers of further consolidation in the European food retail sector.
Outside of food retail, the online challenge is the most significant disruptive element, and we are pleased to share the results of a recent Oliver Wyman study into customer perceptions of online shopping in one of the big European markets. Here, we compare the fortunes of online pure-plays to the online offerings of traditional retailers. Almost without exception, pure-plays are scoring higher with consumers, asking some important questions of the incumbents.

This edition of the Retail Journal also discusses the evergreen topic of loyalty. Our work in this area has convinced us that transactional points-based loyalty programs are no longer good enough. Consumers are looking for more engaging and personalized one-to-one interactions, and technology is enabling new and inventive ways of delivering these relationships. This is a threat as well as an opportunity. For retailers willing and able to reinvent, there is a huge opportunity to create and maintain “sticky” customer relationships by delivering an engaging and useful loyalty ecosystem in which omnichannel can play a decisive role. But it will not be easy. There are new and aggressive competitors in this space – from the internet giants to payments providers and digital wallets – all trying to get in between traditional retailers and their customers. In our view, these players could represent an existential threat over the coming 5–10 years.

As always, I hope you find the Retail Journal rich food for thought.
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From bargain basement to worrisome threat
In a world of new technology and high customer expectations, standard customer loyalty programs based on transactional rewards will soon be recognized for what they really are; undifferentiated, underutilized loss-makers.

Usually, retailers justify the cost of their loyalty program by the data it yields; data which can be used to inform business decisions, sold to suppliers, and used to develop targeted campaigns. But on closer inspection, these additional benefits often do not materialize, nor justify, the investment in the program. Our analysis shows that a transaction-based loyalty program – where the customer is rewarded with a 1% return of the value of their spend – can cost a $10 billion retailer $30-$60 million in reduced margin every year. Add to this the considerable cost of running the program, and these costs will likely never be recouped with the gains made by utilizing the data from the program.

Even if your program isn’t analogous to the one shown in Exhibit 1, we believe the best retail loyalty programs can be better, and indeed, need to improve quickly.
In the first half of this article, we articulate the case for change, and in the second half, we explain what retailers need to be thinking about when it comes to customer loyalty programs.

- **Part 1: The case for change**
  - New competitors are disrupting the market and challenging the status quo.
  - Customer expectations are changing, and today’s customer wants a different experience from their loyalty program.
  - The right technology used in the right way can help meet customer needs in a new and innovative way.

- **Part 2: Getting it right in the real world**
  - Adopt a future-flexible approach to technology, with the retailer owning the overall loyalty ecosystem, but not necessarily every specific component within it.
  - Adopt a start-up mindset to enable long-term investment in the loyalty proposition.
PART 1 | THE CASE FOR CHANGE

NEW COMPETITORS ARE DISRUPTING THE MARKET

Traditional retailers are feeling the pressure to find new ways to stay close to their customers in a world where disruptive new entrants are trying to own the customer relationships that retailers once took for granted. Retailers face an assault on their status as the owner of the customer. Be it online pure-play retail competitors, manufacturers selling direct to consumers, or payment providers and digital wallets, many businesses are now trying to develop direct customer relationships. If they do not respond, retailers will find that over time their customer loyalty decreases as other players join the party.

So, reinventing loyalty is not some passing trend; it is fundamental to continued survival and future success.

Exhibit 1: The economics of a typical loyalty program
Loyalty program cash profit input at a $10 billion retailer
Loyalty program gives 1% return on spend as points

VOLUME UPLIFT DUE TO SCHEME
IN PERCENTAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awarded Points Going Unspent</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-$60 MM</td>
<td>-$53 MM</td>
<td>-$46 MM</td>
<td>-$39 MM</td>
<td>-$33 MM</td>
<td>-$25 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-$51 MM</td>
<td>-$44 MM</td>
<td>-$37 MM</td>
<td>-$30 MM</td>
<td>-$23 MM</td>
<td>-$15 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-$42 MM</td>
<td>-$34 MM</td>
<td>-$27 MM</td>
<td>-$20 MM</td>
<td>-$13 MM</td>
<td>-$6 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-$32 MM</td>
<td>-$25 MM</td>
<td>-$18 MM</td>
<td>-$10 MM</td>
<td>-$3 MM</td>
<td>$4 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-$23 MM</td>
<td>-$15 MM</td>
<td>-$8 MM</td>
<td>-$1 MM</td>
<td>$7 MM</td>
<td>$14 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-$13 MM</td>
<td>-$6 MM</td>
<td>$2 MM</td>
<td>$9 MM</td>
<td>$16 MM</td>
<td>$23 MM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most likely outcome is a $27-$60 MM loss

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS ARE CHANGING

It’s not just that customers want more rewards; they want a different kind of relationship with the businesses they choose to interact with. As such, loyalty programs are changing from transaction-based exchanges between a retailer and a customer, to an ongoing relationship with the customer at the center (Exhibit 2). Our sister firm, Lippincott, specializing in brand and design, examines these trends in depth in the report Welcome to the Human Era: The new model for building trusted connections, and what brands need to do about it.

Many companies are starting to update how their loyalty programs provide shared benefits with customers. Some of the most important trends include:

- Increasing use of exclusive promotions and a move away from points
- Non-monetary rewards and symbols of belonging, such as free coffee at UK grocer Waitrose, or childcare and frozen yogurt at Ikea
- Charity-based rewards and points, such as Kroger’s community awards in the US, or Pets at Home animal charity program in the UK
- Services to improve the shopping experience, such as Neiman Marcus’ shopping app that incorporates shopping, blogging, events, and loyalty points management
- Broader lifestyle applications, such as Walgreens’ Steps program

In these examples, customers are happy to give the retailer access to their data, not because they are getting points in return, but because they are being rewarded or helped in other ways.

Once this virtuous cycle is started, it can be very powerful – customers are prepared to allow more detailed use of their data and more intimate analysis of their habits so long as they are getting useful products and services in return. For the retailer, this extension of brand permission and increase in the number of customer touch points will boost customer loyalty today, and can be monetized in the future (as it increases the range of commercial opportunities in the retailer–customer relationship). Interestingly, many traditional retailers are some of the most trusted brands in their home market, giving them more opportunity to drive this virtuous cycle than many other companies, such as financial services firms or internet giants.

Exhibit 2: Characteristics of loyalty programs, past and present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLD WORLD REWARDS</th>
<th>NEW WORLD AFFINITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Formulaic deal</td>
<td>Relationship and belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Transparent criteria, with no discretion</td>
<td>Role for serendipity and judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time horizon</strong></td>
<td>Present and future</td>
<td>Recognition of the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program language</strong></td>
<td>Points, statements, terms and conditions</td>
<td>Symbols of belonging (without overstepping the mark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification</strong></td>
<td>Plastic card</td>
<td>Crosses all channels and platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customer benefits</strong></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Broader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feeling</strong></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>Appreciation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE RIGHT TECHNOLOGY USED IN THE RIGHT WAY

Technological advances are rapidly changing the loyalty playing field. In the old world, customers would typically have a plastic card scanned on payment, then rewards would be received as coupons or offers through the mail and by email. In recent years, smartphones and other new technologies have transformed this playing field. Customers are always connected and the online and physical worlds are being merged, with customers expecting seamless integration across channels. Real time or time-limited offers are becoming much more common. For example, fashion shoe retailer Meat Pack in Guatemala has GPS embedded into its app and tracks when users enter competitors’ stores. At certain times during its “Hijack” campaign, this triggered a promotional discount for Meat Pack, which started at 99% and decreased every second until the customer entered a Meat Pack store. The discount and subsequent purchase were then automatically shared on Facebook, sending the app viral.

There is much more two-way communication with customers. For example, social media is now a key channel for customers to complain, and they expect their issue to be resolved via the same channel. Additionally, customers are more in control of how they interact with loyalty services; they can choose to share Facebook data to access a discount or enter a competition.

Online services are being brought in-store. For example, there are apps to help customers navigate and find products, as well as smartphone technology to accelerate self-scan and payment.

Underpinning much of this technology are more sophisticated analytics on much bigger datasets. These, along with rapid iterative app development, are becoming important new capabilities for retail IT teams.

PART 2 | GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE REAL WORLD

In reality, an exceptional, original, and effective loyalty program is much easier to describe than it is to deliver. But it can be done. One example is Balance Rewards by US health and beauty retailer, Walgreens. The program is built around unique, non-purchase rewards and creates additional value for both customer and retailer. In Exhibit 3, we summarize how loyalty programs, like the one at Walgreens, operate.

Today, some retailers are making successful changes to their loyalty programs, while others are not. Although no two situations are identical, we would pick out two themes that separate the leaders from the laggards:

1. A future-flexible approach to technology, with the retailer owning the overall loyalty ecosystem, but not necessarily every specific component within it
2. A start-up mindset (and often organizational structure) that enables long-term investment in the loyalty proposition
1. A FUTURE-FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY

Twenty years ago, the first retail loyalty programs relied on expensive in-house systems and technology, and were very inflexible in how they operated. Back then, the only alternative to this model was partnering with third-party providers such as Canada-based Aimia, or Payback, in Germany, but such a move essentially ceded control of much of the loyalty program and data.

Today, flexibility is the watchword. The cost of the technology required to run a loyalty program is much less than it once was, and there are a plethora of specialist providers offering solutions to each different area in the loyalty ecosystem. This gives retailers many options for how to set up the loyalty program: either in-house or outsourced, or a mix, each covering a different aspect of the program.

Exhibit 3: Loyalty program from a customer’s perspective

CUSTOMER VIEW

HOW TO MEET THE CUSTOMER NEED

- Provide relevant rewards for the customer to choose from
- Perform Big Data analyses using multiple sources of data to provide rewards based on consumer behavior and life cycle, with a focus on cross-selling and retention
- Deliver multichannel loyalty with consumer insights and a loyalty program that goes across all sales channels, including stores, brands, and online
- Enable the customer to manage rewards in one place, for example, by bundling miles, points, or rewards into a single app or website
- Give rewards based on the customer sharing more information about themselves, for example, interacting on social media
- Replace loyalty cards with apps
- Push product updates to the customer
- Distribute benefits and coupons direct to a mobile device
- Be flexible to adapt to new consumer technology (phones, tablets, glasses, watches, etc.)
- Make offers made based on geolocation and customer activity or microsegment
- Reward customers with more personalized offers when they share their likes and dislikes
- Introduce a user-friendly platform to change and settings that control contact information, preferences, and so on
CONTROL THE LOYALTY ECOSYSTEM BUT NOT EVERY COMPONENT

Our view is that retailers’ interests are best served if they take control of the overall loyalty ecosystem – rather than outsource it to a single provider – but are comfortable partnering with a number of specialist vendors where they add powerful or differentiated capabilities. Taking a leaf out of Apple’s book and applying this “designed in California” mindset allows retailers to maintain control of their loyalty program without having to develop internal capabilities in every single area of activity.

BE FUTURE-FLEXIBLE, NOT FUTURE-PROOF

Given that customer expectations and technologies are changing rapidly, it is tempting to try to future-proof the loyalty ecosystem by thinking ahead and designing solutions for every eventuality. This approach is unlikely to address as-yet unknown challenges and opportunities ahead. A far better approach is to design a future-flexible loyalty ecosystem, which allows for new components to be plugged in within a modular architecture.

DELIVER EXCELLENCE IN CUSTOMER ANALYTICS AND ITERATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Long-term, competitive differentiation will come from better customer analytics – underpinning more innovative products and services for consumers – as well as improved decisionmaking in the core business.

Linked to this, the fast and continuous development of customer services and apps is an important capability: customers expect the products they use to improve rapidly.

2. A START-UP MINDSET

It’s a simple fact that an effective loyalty program and the IT that enables it, require investment. Most retailers keep tight control on such expenditures and need clear business case justification for investments.

This mindset, though, can be an issue in the loyalty arena. For example, a new menu management app for a food retailer might cost $5 million to develop and launch. Although supported by a strong hypothesis that it would improve customer loyalty and “stickiness” over time, the direct sales benefit of such an app might be difficult to quantify. Understandably, this makes it difficult to raise support for the large initial investment.

In contrast, by using a start-up mindset, the proposition around this app could look quite different. For example, by assigning a $50 value to each customer who downloads the app, you create a way of assessing the app’s cost–benefit, which is much more tangible. Here, it would take 100,000 downloads to cover the app development costs (a small number relative to the millions who shop at large grocers), and would build a much more appealing business case.

We would encourage retailers to think about their loyalty programs in this way and develop new KPIs to measure them accordingly. Doing so will enable them to make – and justify – the investments needed to make their loyalty programs successful.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Today’s customer loyalty leaders are moving away from transactional points-based loyalty programs toward more varied, flexible customer engagement systems (Exhibit 4). Technology is at the heart of this change. Retailers must ensure their programs are structured to support and enable the technological innovations necessary to deliver loyalty programs of the future. In the new world, many retailers will require new KPIs to assess the returns they make in their loyalty programs to make long-term investments possible.

For retailers who succeed, an improved loyalty program can deliver significantly better customer engagement and “stickiness.” It can also act as a defense against disruptive new entrants trying to get between retailers and their customers.
PLAYING HARDBALL

HOW TO RESIST THE HARD DISCOUNT THREAT TO NORTH AMERICAN GROCERY
For food retailers in Europe, intense competition from hard discount formats like Lidl and Aldi is an established part of the competitive landscape. In North America, however, hard discounters remain on the market fringes and show slow growth rates. But current developments indicate that they are poised to make their move.

This article takes a closer look at the hard discount challenge. It explains why the hard discount model works and reviews what is happening in Europe. It then lays out possible strategies that North American food retailers might use to help them adapt successfully to a market where companies new to grocery play by different rules.

HARD DISCOUNT HAS A STRONG TRACK RECORD

The hard discount economic model is an extremely powerful one. Efficiency ensures that low gross margins translate into strong bottom-line profit. Exhibit 1 shows a comparison of the hard discount profit and loss account compared with other grocery formats.

Once hard discounters get going in a market, they start a positive cycle: they attract customers with fantastic prices; increase sales volume and customer numbers, while reducing operating costs; and deliver enough return on capital to reinvest in the customer proposition and fund expansion.

The hard discounter model has been replicated successfully across international markets, including highly saturated ones with established market leaders. It is unique in its ability to enter mature markets and win customers from incumbents. And, as we will describe later, the hard discounters’ offer of low prices with good-quality private-label products attracts customers across the economic spectrum, resulting in decreased sales for grocers near them.

Aldi and Lidl have learned how to balance customization while sticking to a winning formula. Individually their growth patterns are slightly different: Aldi slow and consistent; Lidl more aggressive and prepared to take risks. Both have a proven formula of establishing successful new stores, which in turn encourage more growth.

Exhibit 1: Cost advantage of low-cost competitors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TRADITIONAL SUPERMARKET</th>
<th>TRADITIONAL HYPERMARKET</th>
<th>LOW-COST HYPERMARKET</th>
<th>DISCOUNTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of goods sold and shrink</td>
<td>-69.0%</td>
<td>-73.5%</td>
<td>-76.0%</td>
<td>-81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross margin</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store labor cost</td>
<td>-13.5%</td>
<td>-12.5%</td>
<td>-8.0%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central costs</td>
<td>-14.0%</td>
<td>-12.5%</td>
<td>-10.0%</td>
<td>-8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBITA*1</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 EBITA: earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization
Discounters can offer great value because they have worked closely with food manufacturers for decades. They control how their products are produced, who can produce them, and what trade-offs to make. Having entered and grown their businesses in several countries, discounters have gained the additional advantage of working with regional manufacturers who are artisanal experts, e.g., pasta from Italy, which they can sell with great provenance across their entire estate.

They have scale, too: Aldi and Schwarz Group (Lidl’s parent) are the number one and number two sellers of own-brand grocery products worldwide. This allows them to take a hard-line approach to costs, removing every last element of cost while retaining good quality.

Discounters exploit the traditional grocers’ dependence on complex product ranges. A typical supermarket will give customers a huge breadth of options within each product category: for example, think of the range of instant coffee, filtered coffee, coffee beans, and coffee capsules available in the hot drinks aisle. The lower-selling niche variants may drive a small amount of sales (and a smaller amount of profit) but will also drive up operation costs for the retailer.

In comparison, hard discounters provide perhaps just one leading brand for each category plus an own-label version at a much lower price but with much higher margins. They may not win the fraction of customers who want a decaf latte capsule for their specific coffee machine, but they will satisfy the bulk of the other coffee drinkers by stocking the main brand and impress with the quality and price of their own-brand product.

Discounters’ own-brand goods are high quality, attractively packaged, and a tremendous value. Established grocers, wanting to avoid enticing customers to trade down, typically compete with entry-price own-brand products. These are often of low quality and packaged unattractively to differentiate them from the store’s higher-margin range, creating a wide value gap that customers readily perceive. Exhibit 2 shows how the discounters’ own-brands compare to a traditional UK supermarket’s own-label products on cost and quality.

Exhibit 2: Comparison of price and quality of own-brand baby wipes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aldi</th>
<th>Lidl</th>
<th>Supermarket own label</th>
<th>Supermarket budget own label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRICE</td>
<td>£0.59 for 64</td>
<td>£0.79 for 80</td>
<td>£0.70 for 60</td>
<td>£0.60 for 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9p per wipe</td>
<td>1.0p per wipe</td>
<td>1.2p per wipe</td>
<td>0.8p per wipe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWARD COUNT</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNT</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hard discounters have also been successful at attracting customers from all income brackets, taking market share from traditional retailers. Low-income customers do shop at Aldi, but they are not alone. Middle-class customers are also enjoying the experience of attractive prices without compromising on quality.

In the UK, the financial crisis helped Aldi and Lidl get traction. It is now perfectly acceptable to be seen shopping there and have own-brand products in the cupboard at home. The evidence is that consumers are content to squeeze food budgets if it helps them fund life’s little luxuries, and hard discounters play up to this trend.

THE RISK IS REAL

Incumbents in North America do not sense an imminent threat from hard discounters, citing that they are a tiny fraction of the market and then adding, “My customers wouldn’t shop there.” These are the same themes mentioned years ago in Germany, where today over 40% of the grocery market is held by hard discounters, and by UK supermarkets, who have more recently experienced a loss of market share due to the same erroneous assumptions.

Perhaps it’s true that the North American threat is still low. Aldi Süd and Aldi Nord’s banner, Trader Joe’s, is still small in terms of US market share (1% combined, nationally), and Lidl is one to two years away from entering the market with a significant number of stores. But Aldi Nord’s purchase of 66 Bottom Dollar stores in Pennsylvania from Delhaize at the end of 2014 ought to be a signal to everyone in US food retail that Aldi is preparing to up its game.

The Bottom Dollar deal cuts against the typical pattern for Aldi, which has always expanded with its own stores and maintained consistency across its estate. This suggests that Aldi is anxious to broaden its footprint as quickly as possible – perhaps trying to make the most of the limited window of opportunity before Lidl enters the US.

If the hard discounters are finally able to crack the massive untapped potential in North America, it will seriously disrupt the retail market. We regularly assess customer perception of grocers in the US market, and using these results, we can predict which areas of the market will be most vulnerable to disruption from hard discounters (Exhibit 3).

7,000
The number of stores Aldi and Lidl have opened globally in the past ten years

10,000
The number of stores expected in the next decade, mainly in the US
“You only have to look at where they are putting their stores to know they think they can win with a higher demographic.”

CEO, $BILLION US GROCER
Time and again the hard discounter model has acted as a catalyst for a price war. On top of other competitive pressures, such as current wage strategies aimed at retaining the best employees, this is the last thing the existing North American superstores and supermarkets need. To resist, they should take note of what happened in other countries and be aware that doing nothing is not an option: German grocery was the first to experience hard discounting, and retailers there ignored it and have never recovered. The same is true in the UK, with the exception of Walmart-owned Asda, where waiting too long to respond allowed the hard discounters to establish price gaps so large that closing them would be ruinously expensive for the incumbents.
1. AN OWN-BRAND DISCOUNT FORMAT TAKING ON THE HARD DISCOUNTERS

Reitan operates REMA 1000 in Norway and Denmark as a “soft” discount concept, focusing on a limited offer and a simple shopping experience. (“1000” stands for the typical number of SKUs when the concept was launched.) Their slogan roughly translates to “the simple is often the best,” and customers love their stores despite low investment in aesthetics.

While prices are comparable or slightly higher than Aldi and Lidl, REMA 1000 wins customers through a better shopping experience, compelling own-brand products in the Økologi range, and excellence in its fresh produce.

To deliver this attractive customer proposition, they focus on cost control in the store and throughout the supply chain. Their successful formula has allowed them to grow their estate to 250 stores in Denmark while protecting their profitability amid the hard discounter competition.

2. WINNING THE HIGH-QUALITY, LOW-COST PRODUCT BATTLE

Mercadona is the biggest grocery retailer in Spain (with 35% of the market share). It offers own-label products that are perceived to be as good, if not better, than the top brands, reinforced by a consistent communication strategy of “everyday low prices.” Behind these excellent products is a strong relationship with suppliers based on cooperation, mutual trust, and stability.

In-store, Mercadona has established something of a cult status among employees and consumers. Staff receive an annual bonus; customers experience a clean and tidy shopping environment with very attentive staff. Customers are also able to participate in weekly focus groups to ensure their needs are being met.
But some grocers have had success in resisting moves from Aldi and Lidl (see Case Studies 1 and 2). It is from retailers like these that North American grocers may learn. We believe there are several actions they can take to change things in their favor in advance of Lidl and Aldi’s growth:

- Drive down costs (sales and administration, goods not for resale, logistics) and invest the profits into improving customer experience, as well as lowering prices to minimize the price gap with discounters
- Integrate vertically by making your own-brand product ranges that are great value and matched to local demand
- Strengthen your organization’s expertise in sourcing so you can deliver to your customers a discount own-brand that can stand up to the competition; the sourcing team’s skills should go far beyond just picking products from a catalog
- Invest in a high-quality fresh counter – an area of the store where hard discount cannot match the supermarkets’ quality and experience (see our report, Getting fresh: Lessons from the global leaders in fresh food)
- Don’t be concerned about cannibalizing existing sales – the hard discounters will take market share anyway, so it is better to use a hard or soft discount format to compete against adjacent markets
- Take a hard look at your real estate portfolio and get ready to make adjustments

CONCLUDING REMARKS

With the hard discounters preparing to make a move on the North American grocery sector, incumbent food retailers must put in place their own game plans to ensure a profitable future. It can be done by working closely with manufacturers of basic products and streamlining store operations. Offer unbeatable prices on selected major brands and replace the rest of the basket, including fresh produce, with better quality.

The good news is that taking these steps will help supermarkets win against any type of market disruption, and a drastic change in strategy is not needed. But, for many, what is needed – and urgently – is a radical increase in awareness of the risk to the market and profits. Hard discount is going to become more of a factor in North America; now is the time to prepare for an even tougher competitive environment.

Further reading from Oliver Wyman:

- How to beat lower-priced competition
- The discounter threat: A conversation on front-line retail strategy
- Evolution, growth, and revolution: Lifestage changes in retail
- Getting fresh: Lessons from the global leaders in fresh food
- Making the right choices: SKU rationalization in retail
THE ENDGAME IN EUROPEAN GROCERY

EXPECT HALF AS MANY LARGE GROCERS IN EUROPE BY 2025
Against a weak economic backdrop, old growth models based on store expansion, national consolidation, and diversification are no longer delivering the year-over-year performance board members and investors want to see. As well as a saturated marketplace, there is increasing competition from discounters and newer online retailers like AmazonFresh. In response, we believe that the European grocery market will begin consolidating internationally so that, by 2025, the total number of large grocers in Europe will have halved.

Weak demand, a decline of traditional growth engines, and the aggressive growth of specialist competitors such as discounters (Exhibit 1) will continue to drive the next 10 years of change in European grocery. As the pressure mounts, expect to see more headlines about price wars, stock value erosion, races to form buying alliances, and even the occasional market exit. With this in mind, we think there are four questions grocers should be considering today to ensure a successful future, listed below and explained in more detail in the rest of the article:

1. **How can we deliver a step change in our approach to cost?**  
   Cost leadership is becoming a necessity.

2. **How can asset productivity be increased?**  
   Only business models with high levels of asset productivity will survive.

3. **What are our options to grow internationally?**  
   Scale matters – and international growth is one of the few ways to drive scale.

4. **What more could we be doing to hold on to and build customer relationships?**  
   With new competitors on the scene, increasing the ‘stickiness’ of customers is crucial.
### Exhibit 1: Aldi and Lidl growth in Europe 2004 versus 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in Number of Stores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+1117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>+641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>+594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>+585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>+324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>+298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>+288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>+276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>+248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>+205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>+199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>+188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>+139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>+138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>+130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>+125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>+122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>+115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>+105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>+96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>+84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Aldi Nord plus Aldi Süd plus Lidl

Source: Planet Retail and Oliver Wyman analysis

“Today, 98% of all customers in Germany are no more than 10 minutes away from the nearest discounter.”

Roland Neuwald
1. HOW CAN WE DELIVER A STEP CHANGE IN OUR APPROACH TO COST?

In all areas of the cost base, adapting incrementally is unlikely to be enough. Successful businesses will be those that deliver a clear step change; those that watch and then react will fall behind.

The majority of retailers understand the importance of cost only too well, and incremental cost reduction is a core element in most businesses’ strategic plans, year in, year out. However, we suspect that for many these efforts do not go far enough and that becoming a cost leader will come down to step changes in two areas; buying power through scale, and leaner, smarter operations.

To achieve the scale needed to negotiate improved terms from suppliers, buying alliances like those shown in Exhibit 2 will continue to form and grow, and we think all retailers should review their options for joining or building an alliance. Retailers not participating in these buying groups must ensure they are able to deliver world-class procurement, for example by using data to create a real advantage in supplier negotiations (see our report, Smarter Arguments for Higher Profits: Reversing the Information Asymmetry).

Exhibit 2: European grocer buying alliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMD</th>
<th>In France</th>
<th>Strategic partnership announced in June 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Axfood</td>
<td>Carrefour + Dia + CORA</td>
<td>Rewe Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe Casino</td>
<td>Groupe Auchan + Systeme U</td>
<td>E.Leclerc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markant</td>
<td>ITM Entreprises + Groupe Casino</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>dm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaiser’s Tengelmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaufland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Müller</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rossmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norges Gruppen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SuperGros</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...et al.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ALIDIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edeka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITM Entreprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grupo Eroski</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COOPERNIC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coop Italia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhaize Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.Leclerc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe Auchan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* E.Leclerc and Rewe Group announced in June 2015 their own strategic partnership

Note Status as of June 2015
To truly outpace the competition, fresh thinking will be required to take cost out of other areas of the business. For example, you could behave like a discounter and ask if some product ranges could be rationalized in order to reduce cost and complexity in the supply chain. Or you could consider how automated algorithms, like those used by lean online retailers, could be used to manage more of the day-to-day pricing decisions. These approaches will doubtless involve asking difficult questions and challenging the status quo, but the profitability advantages they create will provide a degree of protection against volume losses other grocers may not have, as shown in Exhibit 3.

2. HOW CAN ASSET PRODUCTIVITY BE INCREASED?

With margins shrinking and the future looking uncertain, underperforming stores will be scrutinized, with closures not ruled out. While in many cases long-term leases will prevent outright closures, there are still innovative ways in which the productivity of such sites can be improved. For example, they can serve as pick-up points and host collection lockers, including for other non-competing retailers. In the UK, for years customers have been able to pick up their John Lewis homeware order from a local Waitrose supermarket (both are members of the John Lewis Partnership), and now they can also collect their eBay purchases from one of thousands of Argos stores.

These collaborations can allow one partner to deliver low-cost points of presence and the other to make use of excess space. This is exactly what UK grocer Sainsbury’s is doing by opening up Argos outlets in its stores, and the idea doesn’t have to be limited to retailer-retailer relationships: P&G allowed Amazon to set up fulfilment operations within its own warehouses in the US to reduce transportation costs and speed up delivery.

Exhibit 3: Example of how small profitability advantages can reduce the impact of volume loss from online disruption

![Exhibit 3: Example of how small profitability advantages can reduce the impact of volume loss from online disruption](image)

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Driving asset utilization can be a very powerful way of strengthening the economic model of the business. Making better use of the costs you have can be just as important as reducing those costs in the first place.

3. WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS TO GROW INTERNATIONALLY?

It’s clear that scale will continue to drive financial strength. However, in many European countries, national consolidation has reached saturation point, and some regulators are unwilling to allow further take-overs or mergers among the remaining large retailers. The alternative is a strategy long considered out of fashion in grocery retail – international consolidation.

Most industries consolidate as they mature (Exhibit 4), with major players expanding and often buying up competitors – initially within national markets, but eventually across borders. On the way, underperformers and slower movers are targeted and absorbed. In grocery, we’ve seen cross-border consolidation successfully deployed by hard discounters, warehouse clubs, and cash-and-carry stores. For example, Aldi has expanded across Europe and has grown Trader Joe’s in the US since it purchased the business in 1979.

In a world of one-to-one, bespoke customer interactions, taking an international view could also open up new and very specific customer innovations. Technology will be a key enabler of this type of innovation: for example a great meal-planning app for those on specialist diets would be popular regardless of geography. After all, a gluten-intolerant customer in Spain has more in common with a gluten-intolerant customer in Finland than they might with the average Spanish grocery shopper. Once customers are served in this way, national boundaries will break down even further.

Exhibit 4: Consolidation will play out in grocery in a similar way to other industries

A small number of large companies reign in industries such as tobacco, soft drinks, defence, and automotive – and we expect to see grocery starting to move up this consolidation curve in the next decade. In other areas of retail, we already see examples such as furniture (IKEA), clothing (Indix and H&M), and luxury goods. Given this pattern, a company’s long-term success depends on how quickly and successfully it moves up the consolidation curve. Slower movers will disappear or become targets. Staying out of the contest or ignoring it does not increase your chances of survival.
4. WHAT MORE COULD WE BE DOING TO HOLD ON TO AND BUILD CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS?

For Europe’s major grocery chains, owning the customer relationship is crucial to their long-term future, and traditional retailers will need to fight to keep the customer relationships they once took for granted. New business models have been causing market disruption by fulfilling the traditional retail role in a new way (AmazonFresh, Google Shopping) and by positioning themselves as the final and personal touchpoint in the value chain (Shutl, DPD, Uber). Success and failure will be driven by how well grocers can counter these newer competitors – such as online aggregators and last-mile distributors – to maintain the all-important customer contact.

In such an environment, knowledge is power, and asking the right questions of your customer data is essential if you are to successfully develop relationships on an individual basis and build “sticky” proprietary ecosystems with differentiated customer experiences.

Judicious analysis and use of data are key, and an important strength will be the ability to quickly develop apps and information-driven services that are better, more exciting, and more relevant. For example, the menu and diet management app mentioned earlier could provide exceptional personal value for a subset of customers, radically increasing their brand loyalty to that particular business.

THE ENDGAME

As European grocery markets move toward consolidation, we believe retailers will eventually split into two camps: superpowers and nimble local winners (Exhibit 5).

In this market, there will be fewer grocers than today. Right now there are 25 big names, each with over €10 billion in revenue. By 2025, we suspect this will have fallen by half – although the survivors will be much, much larger.

Exhibit 5: What grocery retailers will look like in 2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>THE SUPERPOWERS</th>
<th>THE NIMBLE LOCAL WINNERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Strong pan-European presence</td>
<td>National and local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition</td>
<td>Mostly specialists. A few generalists who differentiate through better customer connections and efficient management and operations</td>
<td>Offer tailored at a local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival advantage</td>
<td>Economies of scale</td>
<td>Innovation and creative strategies that can quickly adapt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO BE A WINNER?

Companies that move first and move fast will obviously be in a strong position, but they must ensure they are traveling in the right direction. Regardless of whether your business will be a superpower or a nimble local winner, we think there are three key areas to focus on to help you survive and thrive in the future.

1. THINK LONG TERM AND INVEST IN STRATEGY

We encourage retailers to think about where they need to be in five or ten years’ time, rather than focussing on where they are starting from today. The aim is to move beyond short-term, incremental steps and instead plan step changes across the whole organization. This way, you will be able to tackle the latest market disruptions and quickly adapt to ones you may not see coming.

To make a realistic assessment of your position and the options open to you, model the European grocery market as a whole and simulate the biggest, most dramatic changes that could occur. Perhaps the most significant threat to your business will be consolidation, or perhaps it will be a local challenge: either way, forewarned is forearmed.

Study what happened as other industries moved up the consolidation curve in Exhibit 4 and learn from what worked and what didn’t. Our article, “Trading Places,” in the second volume of Ten Ideas From Oliver Wyman, expands on the benefits of this kind of cross-industry thinking.

2. DO THE BASICS, AND DO THEM WELL

As discussed earlier, in a saturated market, year-over-year growth has to come from reconfiguring the existing business to make it more productive. This is why there is so much focus on improving the proposition, increasing operational efficiency, and reducing costs.

A strong unique proposition can reduce customer turnover and be a first step toward winning market share. Whether online or in-store, identify what customers want and how to give it to them in a way that the competition cannot. Find out what they don’t value and look at ways to remove it from your proposition, thereby saving both you and them money.

Many retailers are overrun with data yet have not managed to unlock the performance improvement this data can deliver. For example, the right category management app can increase the time that category managers spend pricing products rather than processing the insight data, enabling them to make better decisions and react faster. Similarly, armed with the right supplier negotiation tool, we’ve helped grocers integrate dozens of different data sources, perform sophisticated value-added analyses, and generate easy-to-consume reports in a format suited to supplier discussions.
3. SHAPE THE FUTURE – DON’T LET IT SHAPE YOU

We’ve mentioned previously the importance of being a leader rather than a follower. Customers don’t typically notice copycat strategies, and a rushed response to an unforeseen change usually leads to poor execution at a higher cost. For most organizations, taking control of their own future will mean building more experimentation, risk taking, and agility into their culture. This will help you become “future flexible” rather than “future proof,” which we believe is the best way to meet the changes coming over the next decade.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The European grocery market will not be significantly larger in 2025 than it is today. What will be different is its composition. After intense international consolidation, there will be fewer large retailers, with those remaining each controlling a greater proportion of the market. If your business doesn’t go down this route, perhaps it will be one of the smaller – but still profitable – nimble local grocers who are able to quickly and efficiently meet the needs of a smaller subset of customers.

Either way, to emerge as a winner in this new ecosystem, actions must be taken today. The future will favor those who move now and move boldly – the time for small incremental change is over.
Grocers who can identify where they want to be in 2025, and are bold enough to make the right early moves to get there, have a very exciting future.
THE NEW IT HORIZON

HOW THREE YEARS FROM NOW CHANGES EVERYTHING YOU DO TODAY
Tomorrow, IT’s business innovations will be a major contributor to a retailer’s on-going success. For some retailers, tomorrow has already arrived, and IT is helping them move at the speed of their digital consumers – simultaneously repositioning IT from an enabler of operations to a creator of business value. The timing of when a CIO moves his or her organization to be a source of business innovation is largely determined by the level of consumer demand for a digitally-enhanced retail experience. We believe this consumer shift has broadly happened, changing the question for every retailer from when to shift the organization to how to shift it. Our discussions with retail CIOs reveal that they concur but are uncertain as to how to make the move without breaking either the business or the organization.

The arrival of digital enterprises has meant a fundamentally different role for IT: in most of these companies, IT doesn’t just enable the business, IT creates the business. For retailers such as Amazon and Instacart (and other online businesses such as Uber and Airbnb), IT is at the very core of how they operate.
Below is our checklist highlighting the top four goals a retail CIO will need to achieve to lead the business through this transformation. The rest of this article explains in depth the way each question should be approached.

TOP FOUR GOALS FOR THE CIO

Be a creator of value, not a taker of orders
Articulate a clear future operating model
Breed the next generation of technology pentathletes
Focus on where you need to be tomorrow, rather than where you start from today

BE A CREATOR OF VALUE, NOT A TAKER OF ORDERS

CIO CHECKLIST

✓ Identify how IT will act as a value creator in your business, and move away from being a function that takes orders
✓ Develop a point of view on how to drive business value by:
  ✓ Winning new customers
  ✓ Running the business more efficiently
  ✓ Driving innovation

WINNING NEW CUSTOMERS

In digital businesses, dedicated teams of IT experts focus on finding new ways to serve customers. They continually develop new products, such as applications for healthy eating or portals for personalized product generation. And just as importantly, they are constantly looking for ways to use information to make the customer experience easier, more engaging, and more consistent across all channels.

This approach is not unique to Silicon Valley start-ups. In supermarkets, augmented reality apps that provide shoppers with additional product or promotion information are now widespread, and for customers who participate in smart loyalty programs this information can easily be personalized.
Recently, non-food retailers such as Shiseido, De Beers, Topshop, American Apparel, and IKEA have created offerings for shoppers to interact with products electronically, simplifying and enhancing the shopping experience.

Just as Amazon uses all the information it has on shoppers browsing its website to devise upselling and cross-selling offers, bricks-and-mortar retailers can identify shoppers entering their stores, access their preference data and virtual shopping carts automatically, and create personalized offerings for them.

In today’s retail IT leaders, these customer-facing technologies can be built rapidly and iteratively, with quick-fire beta versions – a development path that is in many ways the opposite of what traditional IT departments are used to. And since new technologies are always being designed, the IT ecosystem has to be flexible enough to accommodate them. Tools such as SAP HANA for CRM and Business Intelligence applications can be used to process unprecedented amounts of data quickly, in turn feeding additional IT applications to react to this information (“real-time retail”).

RUNNING THE BUSINESS MORE EFFECTIVELY

Learning from digital players to develop the customer proposition and create an appealing, reliable multichannel shopping experience is critical, but for mature retailers, technology has the potential to deliver much more besides. The low margins and large store estates that typify most sectors make every drop of economic benefit critical. IT can help retailers achieve this in three ways: greater task automation, better operational algorithms, and better business intelligence.

GREATER TASK AUTOMATION

Building apps to support customer self-service and automating repetitive tasks can significantly drive down labor costs. Although there are already many examples in stores, from classic vending to digital signage to checkout automation, untapped potential remains.

Automation can be applied to individual service tasks such as refunds, store navigation, and beyond, to reinvent whole elements of the retail process for further improved efficiency. For example, retailers are already streamlining the checkout process through self-scan and Point of Sale (PoS) applications, and in the future robots may be capable of shelf stacking more cheaply than humans. Even today, retailers such as Nespresso, Best Buy, and The Body Shop are experimenting with the automation of entire shops.

BETTER OPERATIONAL ALGORITHMS

Retailers already use the vast amount of data they collect to deliver efficiency improvements in real time by building algorithms that can make detailed decisions without intervention by store managers. For example:

- Checkout labor can be managed automatically by using infrared sensors to count the number of shoppers entering a store.
- Replenishment instructions can be generated automatically when sales data tell the retailer stock is low.
BACKGROUND
A retailer was facing imminent crisis with its prices 25% more expensive than online competition. A promotions program was needed to generate sustainable funding for price reductions.

IT INTERVENTION
Using an agile approach to IT, Oliver Wyman created an elegant user-friendly app that collated and presented information for better decision making around promotions and competitive pricing. The app was successful in integrating industry knowledge and analytical insights and models into the existing commercial processes.

BUSINESS OUTCOMES
- High-quality, analytically-based decisions
- Traders in control and accountable for results
- Time-efficient
- Ability to learn and inform strategy
- Cash from IT
However, further optimization opportunities still exist, with one UK retailer reporting $150 million of supply chain savings in 2014. Further areas of Big Data interest include weather-driven demand and predicting product returns.

**BETTER BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE**

In many ways, the biggest opportunity for IT will be in the application of business intelligence: delivering management information systems that allow retail executives to make decisions better and faster. Managers in trading and operations departments need to make hundreds of important decisions every week and, since they are under huge time pressures, having the right information at the touch of a button in an accessible, user-friendly format can make a big difference.

Exhibit 1 provides an example, highlighting how a more advanced approach to business intelligence can transform decision making in trading.

**DRIVING INNOVATION**

With IT playing an ever more central role in customer proposition development and core business process execution, its overall position in the business will also evolve. In this fast-changing world, the IT department becomes central to the strategy and transformation of the business, and drives innovation. This is very different from the historical role of many retail IT departments, which were focused on making sure things didn’t break, or on incremental optimization of existing technology processes to make them 10% better, faster, or cheaper.

All of these changes impact the role of the CIO more than any other, so much so that there’s an argument for splitting the job into two separate positions; Chief Technology Officer and Chief Innovation Officer.

In any case, CIOs need to become strategic partners for the board and the CEO, educating them on the benefits of digital approaches. They need a deep understanding of market dynamics, customer preferences, competitive landscape, opportunities, and threats. Additionally, they need to be able to identify and prepare for seismic changes before they happen and navigate them safely when they do.

Overall, IT and the CIO need to move from being enablers to being creators. To put it another way, although operational efficiency and business as usual are still important, they are irrelevant in isolation. In the evolving world of multichannel retail, it is just as important for a CIO to focus on developing innovative and creative solutions that will confer a real competitive advantage.

This move from enabler to creator implies a revolution in the activity of many IT departments. Thankfully, in parallel, the evolution of the IT industry has opened up new possibilities in how IT can be delivered. Together, these two developments mean the retail IT department of the near future will look very different.
### ARTICULATE A CLEAR FUTURE OPERATING MODEL

#### CIO CHECKLIST

- Define your view on becoming a smaller, leaner, better IT department:
  - Have a clear vision on the future operating model
  - Identify what will become a commodity and what will be the technology differentiators for the business
  - Know which processes to keep in house and which can be outsourced
  - Identify where the layers of intelligence will be
  - Invest in beating the competition on the differentiators while reducing cost of the commodity elements by at least 20%
  - Collaborate to design a clear map of the transformation you need to truly deliver long-term, value-adding strategic goals

IT no longer needs to be something you own and run. Instead, it can be a service you purchase. In infrastructure, server hardware ownership is obsolete. The browser has become the universal interface, with applications ever more decoupled from infrastructure. Development environments, incorporating backup and recovery, database setup, and web-based code development in the cloud, can all be procured in a single transaction. Meanwhile, production environments can be replaced with Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or vendor hosting, and even software development can be bought as a service, reducing the need for internal hiring and skill development.

Routine, non-strategic core and support applications – in areas such as space management, selecting goods, checkouts, and taking goods home – can almost always be outsourced to service providers. Most applications will be available via the cloud, with retailers moving to a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model.

It is already possible to purchase whole processes – such as “procure to pay” or “hire to retire” – as services, and this market is only likely to grow. This means lower costs, as the investment and operational burden is pooled and utilization of both hardware and software is increased through dynamic capacity alignment. It also enables new levels of flexibility, which is vital in itself. It is only by adopting the PaaS and SaaS approaches that IT can become flexible enough to cope with total mobility and the need for end-to-end connectivity, or to plug in different elements to the ecosystem (such as new customer front-ends) to dynamically add capacity as needed.

However, even in so-called non-strategic areas, retailers may still choose to manage the key micro-processes that comprise the critical “intelligence layer.” The intelligence layer is where the information, insights, and orchestration reside.

With the model evolving from ownership to procurement, the role of IT is moving to one of sophisticated specifier and purchaser of services – with the design of risk and benefit-sharing mechanisms a critical capability. Only strategically important, differentiating applications should remain in house.
Some such applications – covering areas such as customer management, pricing, promotions, and proposition development – should still be developed, operated, and maintained in the traditional in-house way. But while retailers keep ownership of the mega-processes, they can buy many of the supporting micro-processes, such as market testing, product range planning, and customer analytics. Overall, the new model for IT in retail involves much less in-house development than in the past.

The challenge for the CIO is to know which areas should receive the investment of precious internal resources – and must in turn provide real differentiation – and which can be safely and cheaply outsourced. The key is to understand the relative importance of resilience, innovation, and cost in different parts of the business.

Exhibit 2 gives an example of a migration map showing the desired end-state and migration sequence. In this case, a bricks-and-mortar retailer wanted to migrate to an omnichannel offering over two or three years. In the traditional world, the in-house IT team owned and ran proprietary systems to support all business functions. Here, the CIO understood the need to identify and differentiate between those elements that were strategic (and would require in-house focus) and those that could be outsourced as a commodity.

A learning period was necessary to develop future-state processes and systems for the online world. However, over time, a single set of systems, with many off-the-shelf elements, and differentiating, proprietary intelligence layers were developed across all channels using a portfolio approach.
BREED THE NEXT GENERATION OF TECHNOLOGY PENTATHLETES

CIO CHECKLIST

- Understand what you don’t need in the new world of IT
- Ensure your team members each have multiple capabilities to excel in the new world
  - Architecture and technology delivery
  - Business process know-how
  - Commercial acumen
  - Partner management
  - Strategic thinking

The portfolio approach to IT strategy has clear implications for the work of the IT department: some responsibilities will disappear, while others will become much more important. As a result, the size and shape of the IT department will change.

In the past, routine maintenance and repair has accounted for much of the work of a retailer’s IT department. This responsibility will shrink as systems are outsourced and PaaS and SaaS approaches continue to become more prevalent. The new focus will be on developing and managing critical applications, integrating services from a diverse set of suppliers, and managing the relationships with these suppliers.

For strategic core applications, the IT department will need to act as in-house demand managers, with excellent functional and business knowledge. Given the need to coordinate numerous external vendors, architecture management will also be kept in house, with the enterprise architects themselves becoming more business savvy as well as hands-on technical and practical.

For non-strategic and support applications, the IT department will act as a separate service management organization, overseeing the relationship with external providers to ensure that the business retains ultimate control of IT service delivery and that costs don’t creep up over time.

As some roles disappear, others emerge. Increasingly tasked with delivering strategic initiatives that can transform the whole business, IT now needs to become a full partner in business decisionmaking, and to think and communicate in business terms. This means new positions will be needed, dedicated to looking for new IT-driven business ideas and IT-created business process efficiencies.
Meanwhile, day-to-day ways of working are changing, moving from traditional waterfall to more agile approaches, where the outcome is not necessarily known before work starts and flexibility of thinking and tools will be needed.

All this means that the job description of the internal IT team will change dramatically. In the future, retailers will need a cohort of “IT pentathletes” who can source, procure, and integrate across a broad range of service partners – a more highly skilled but smaller IT department.

The changes in how IT is delivered will transform retailers’ IT cost structure. Today, typical cost levels in the sector are around 0.7% to 1.0% of revenue. Using a mix of traditional cost-reduction techniques and the “as a service” principle, we believe IT cost can be driven down by up to 50%, as Exhibit 3 explains in more detail.

Exhibit 3: “As a service” operating models and role alignment drive IT costs down

IT BUDGET NORMALIZED VERSUS INITIAL SPEND
IN PERCENTAGE

- Demand reduction
- Supplier consolidation
- Rate renegotiation
- SLA reduction

- As a service
  - Infrastructure
  - Software
  - Development

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
FOCUS ON WHERE YOU NEED TO BE TOMORROW, RATHER THAN WHERE YOU START FROM TODAY

CIO CHECKLIST

☑ Get your team and the C-suite to move beyond the three-month horizon and start planning backwards from where you want to be in three years
☑ Be the architect behind a plan that really moves the strategy and innovation for the whole business
☑ Understand the personality of your organization (for example: in denial, business as usual, eager for change) and adapt your plan accordingly

The changes we’ve described present a huge challenge for a mature retailer: it will be difficult to turn today’s IT approach, capabilities, and infrastructure into something that meets the needs of tomorrow’s multichannel business.

In our experience, retail CIOs and their organizations are sometimes in denial about the changes required, continuing to play an enabling role without confronting the need for reinvention; or they believe that the transformation can be handled as business as usual, relying on the tried-and-tested approach of incremental cycles of tactical optimization to get them somewhere better.

Even in cases where they understand the need for radical change, it’s rare to meet a CIO who feels this can actually be achieved – understandable given day-to-day responsibilities and constant pressure on both operating and capital expenses.
One of the biggest problems is the incrementalism trap; thinking that the way to build an effective IT architecture is through a succession of small steps. Retailers are great at driving incremental execution and delivering on never-ending loops of marginal optimization. Until very recently, this was the key to success in an industry with fierce competition where the impact of technological change tended to be limited. But in the face of the threats posed by e-commerce, incremental changes aren’t enough to give the business the support it needs to survive now.

The solution is to focus on where you need to be tomorrow, rather than where you start from today, and insist on bringing perspectives from other industries. This type of thinking begins with the position the retailer needs to be in three to five years in order to be competitive: working backwards from this target defines the sequence of changes required to achieve it. This deceptively simple approach can be surprisingly effective in forcing the business – and the CIO – to face up to the true scale of the challenge and understand that even perfectly executed incremental change will leave the company fully prepared for the wrong future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It’s hard to overstate the impact the current changes to the retail industry will have on IT departments. The CIO’s job will be transformed from supporting and enabling to shaping the strategy of the business as a whole, with a focus on innovation and value creation. IT architectures will be unrecognizably different from those of a decade ago and will be built and supported in different ways. As a result, retail IT departments will need radically different capabilities than they have today – or are currently building.

Success in multichannel retail relies on a radically different IT architecture and a radically different role for the CIO. It requires nothing less than the reinvention of the IT approach: incremental improvements can never deliver the changes required.
Most retailers agree that sustainability will be a key competitive advantage in the future. Unfortunately, there is a wide gap between their ambitions and reality.

A growing mismatch between supply and demand could erode the profits of the entire food industry within four decades. Global demand for agricultural production is expected to grow by 70% by mid-century, and the global average per capita caloric intake is projected to increase by about 40%. The problem is that global food production already utilizes about 50% of arable land surface available, and the global agricultural sector already consumes about 70% of the fresh water available for human use.

Our research shows there is a broad consensus among retailers that they will almost certainly face wrenching cost and availability problems as a result of the divide that is developing between supply and demand. Most also believe that they will be confronted with very different demand patterns as customer priorities and regulations change. Ninety percent of the top 50 global grocery retailers market their own private-label organic products, and 68% publish a sustainability report (see Exhibit 1). In their annual reports, 82% of grocery retail CEOs cite sustainability as a key priority. More than one in three has opened “green” pilot stores.

Nevertheless, the reality behind these flagship initiatives continues to be largely unsustainable. While sustainability now routinely figures in evaluating investment decisions and corporate projects, it has had little effect on the key commercial activities of the business – buying, store operations, or supply chain decisions. In most cases, sustainable product lines account for only a small fraction of sales revenues, and, with new product development and space decisions still dominated by other priorities, change will be slow.

Although retailers’ advertising campaigns are increasingly built around green messages and products, their in-store price promotions largely ignore them – and these account for a very significant proportion of sales. The vast majority of new stores also have little to do with their green concept stores. More than 99% of all stores are still traditional, non-green formats.
WHY SUSTAINABILITY IS NOT STICKING

Retail is characterized by low margins, pressing daily challenges, and global, complex supply chains. As a result, retailers focus on pressing, urgent matters, leaving sustainability in the backseat. Even deeply committed retailers often struggle to achieve real impact.

In our experience, there are two reasons that this keeps happening. Firstly, retailers fail to incorporate sustainability into their daily decision making. At many (and perhaps even most) retailers, decision-making is spread out across hundreds of buyers, category managers, procurement managers, store associates, logistics specialists, and ordering managers.

While 42% of the top 50 global grocery retailers have established a sustainability function, and 14% now have a “Chief Sustainability Officer,” only 10% of these grocery retailers actually measure and incentivize personal performance against key performance indicators of sustainability. In this context, it’s not surprising that sustainability often remains limited to a few corporate “lighthouse” projects, and rarely trickles down into decisions such as which products to carry, or what to promote next month. If sustainability is not an important factor alongside sales, volumes, and margins, decision makers will tend to ignore it.

Secondly, another challenge retailers face is that they can’t manage what they don’t measure. In order to make their core business model sustainable, retailers must understand the financial impact of sustainability initiatives. But only 16% of the top 50 grocers evaluate how sustainability efforts translate into financial outcomes. As a result, it is hard to define realistic targets, shape decision making, and measure progress. Identifying and generating the right key performance indicators can be a difficult undertaking. Often, there is insufficient data. And even when such data exists, disentangling the link, for example, between improving a company’s ecological footprint and its economics, is far from straightforward.

82% of Grocery retail CEOs who cite sustainability as a key priority
Nonetheless, leaders in sustainability have shown that it is possible not only to find ways to measure the impact of their efforts, but also to use this knowledge to achieve their ambitions. Given how decentralized decision-making is in a typical retailer, making sustainability a reality requires “getting into the bloodstream” of the whole organization, particularly the decisionmakers in trading and operations. Our work with clients points to five important success factors.

**FACTOR 1 | CLEAR, STRATEGIC INTENT**

Organizations must establish a clear strategic plan that is regularly reinforced over multiple years. Achieving this requires continuous and unambiguous top-level support. A company’s management team must acknowledge the organizational and cultural challenges involved in targeting longer-term and more holistic objectives – while not losing focus on short-term sales, costs, and margins.

**FACTOR 2 | GREATER TRANSPARENCY**

Measuring the ecological and social footprint of an organization’s products and operations is very difficult, especially on the product side, since most resources are used earlier on. But the task is not impossible. To date, most retailers have focused on availability, cost, and time-to-market in their attempts to better understand upstream supply chains. In the future, supply-chain management and supply-chain collaboration will need to put as much, if not more, emphasis on resource usage, renewable resources, and social standards.

**FACTOR 3 | DEFINED TARGETS**

Realizing a sustainability strategy requires quantified, operationalized objectives for functions and individuals, for both the short and the long term. For sustainability to become a reality, decision makers need to place it on a par with financial performance – and not just a “nice to have.” This requires setting specific goals.
FACTOR 4 | INCLUDING SUSTAINABILITY IN DAILY DECISIONS

Sustainability needs to be incorporated into daily decision making in a dispassionate, transparent, and quantitative way. To be effective, there needs to be a detailed understanding of how, when, and by whom decisions are being made, as well as how to influence and change them. Just throwing more data at buyers and at category and operations managers is not enough.

FACTOR 5 | MEASURING THE IMPACT

Organizations must be vigilant in measuring detailed and quantified results delivered against the targets set. As described earlier, ongoing measurement using key performance indicators is a vital part of embedding sustainability into the organization. Without that, it is very difficult indeed to know how successful the strategy has been, or to ensure that sustainability remains foremost in the minds of those making day-to-day decisions.

Exhibit 1: Sustainability in the world’s top 50 grocers

- **90%** of the top 50 grocers worldwide offer an organic private-label product range
- **16%** of the top 50 grocers worldwide measure and communicate the financial impact of sustainability initiatives
- **68%** of the top 50 grocers worldwide publish a sustainability report
- **10%** of the top 50 grocers worldwide systematically measure personal performance against sustainability key performance indicators

**Source:** Oliver Wyman analysis
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Building a sustainable retail business model is not easy. It costs money, and is not without risk. The argument for becoming sustainable is fundamentally underpinned by a need: coping in a world of finite resources and increasingly stark trade-offs. The business case for sustainability is fundamentally long term, driven by the need to address emerging but anticipatable realities – ones that only become obvious over time.

But even today, sustainability offers tangible opportunities to drive growth and to reduce costs. In Switzerland, sales of the Coop Group’s private-label sustainability brands and quality labels have reached $2 billion – more than 18% of its food revenues. Coop’s market share in Switzerland in organic products exceeds its overall market share by more than 100%. In the UK, Marks & Spencer has generated more than $168 million in net benefits, by reducing packaging, decreasing landfill waste, improving transport, and adopting energy efficiency initiatives.

These and other pioneers have shown there is a path to profitability in sustainability. Over the next four decades, companies that follow in the footsteps of these early pioneers, as opposed to those that do not, may find the key to prospering in an increasingly harsh landscape lies in doing the “right thing.”
Retailers in every sector have already squeezed stores with optimization programs, but we think many have missed the role played by central functions in helping stores become more efficient. By making the fundamental parts of stores’ day-to-day operations simpler and faster, the head office has a key role to play in creating front-line efficiencies, improving customer experience, and improving staff morale. In this article, we explain in more detail why this needs to be done and use case studies to share best practices.

The need for cost-efficient retail operations has never been higher, with low-cost internet and discounter competition affecting most retail sectors and markets in one way or another.

Most often, retailers use the well-established technique of independently tightening purchasing, category management, logistics, or operations to deliver cost savings. The head office, for example, will squeeze store labor budgets, but this over-run play has tapped that bucket dry, reducing store staffing levels to bare minimum levels over the years. Store personnel struggle to meet customer expectations, causing the vicious cycle of disappointed customers fueling frustrated employees – a cycle which puts the shopping experience and revenue at risk. Similar department-specific efforts, while successful years ago, have squeezed most of the juice from each of their departmental fruit, begging the question, rather than squeezing harder, is there a way to squeeze smarter?

We think there is a better way to achieve savings; by breaking down department silos and taking a store-centric approach to simplifying tasks and reducing costs. The heart of this approach involves taking the perspective of the customer and the staff on the front line, and asking what head office and other departments can do to simplify their lives, and consequently, take cost out of the operations. In our experience, there is potential for a typical €10 billion retailer to unlock €100 million in additional efficiencies within a period of 6-12 months. The beauty of this approach is that customer outcomes and staff morale can often be improved at the same time.
HOW TO DESIGN COST-SAVING SOLUTIONS AROUND STORE NEEDS

To design and deliver store-centric cost savings, central departments must first do their homework and take the stores’ perspective, looking at what causes hassles for customers and staff, and aiming to address them head on.

The first step is often to get a clear understanding of how staff time is actually spent in stores, as shown in Exhibit 1. Transparency can be hard to come by, therefore, the starting point is an intense period spent on the shop floor fully engaging with front-line challenges. This process should also develop key hypotheses on potential improvements. It might involve asking:

- What are the most annoying time wasters?
- How many hours are allocated to particular processes within a certain department?
- What further optimization measures could be achieved?

Exhibit 1: Staff activities by department

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
### Exhibit 2: Solving in-store hassles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hassle</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long distances walked by staff</td>
<td>Distances walked by staff in stores are unnecessarily long, for example during replenishment or updating price labels on the shelf.</td>
<td>Shorten replenishment distances by positioning containers in the warehouse in the same order as the standard store layout. Allow flexibility for stores to create customized routes for various tasks, such as price label updates. See Case Study 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting times at tills</td>
<td>Checkout processes lack efficiency due to system mistakes, frequent calls for store manager overrides, or products with barcodes that are difficult to scan – also resulting in waiting times and unsatisfied customers.</td>
<td>Comprehensively check the scanning efficiency of products in terms of barcode performance and placement, check tills regarding efficiency: regulations, technical infrastructure, and qualification of cashiers. See Case Study 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor on-shelf availability</td>
<td>Out-of-stocks are often caused because automatic or semi-automatic ordering systems are too complex and ordering tools for staff are not helpful; hence sales may not be backed by sufficient supplies.</td>
<td>Screen most common reasons for out-of-stocks and check forecasting systems and inventory tools for weaknesses – if possible adjust system parameters and simplify tools. See Case Study 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex promotions</td>
<td>Weekly handling of promotions is often a major driver of store complexity. Promotional stock is often ordered several weeks in advance and forecasting systems (if available for promotions on a store level at all) are far from perfect.</td>
<td>Forecasting of promotions should be solved centrally using advanced algorithms to give stores accurate forecasts for promotional items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting overkill</td>
<td>Reports and KPIs lack usability, are time-consuming to read, and are rarely, if at all, used to drive improvements. Often, they are redundant.</td>
<td>Implement a simplified cross-silo point of view on your reporting structure. See Case Study 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor logistics</td>
<td>Delivery is not within the promised time window or is missing items, and packing within containers is often poor.</td>
<td>Implement strict service-level agreements that give stores more certainty in operational planning and higher delivery standards. This may increase costs in the supply chain but the savings in store will more than compensate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labour scheduling</td>
<td>Store managers plan their staffing “on the back of an envelope.” Often, labor-planning tools are not user friendly or too theoretical.</td>
<td>Collect local best practices from stores and develop a pragmatic user-friendly labor-scheduling tool, linked to individual store needs and taking into account activity-based labor requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training programs not fit for purpose</td>
<td>Training for store staff contains lots of theory and guideline sessions, and lacks practical coaching and training of best-practice processes and tips and tricks.</td>
<td>Engage store staff in designing training programs. Ideally training should take place on the shop floor and be based on real-life examples and best practices. Make sure that HR and central sales departments collaborate regularly with stores in order to have best practices and tips and tricks included and up-to-date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exhibit 2 shows some examples of typical hassles and solutions that are often unearthed by this type of process.

It is crucial to follow a detailed systematic process to identify, prioritize, develop, and implement opportunities, such as that shown in Exhibit 3.

Following this process, the results can usually be seen and measured within 6–12 months. Typical outcomes include:

- Up to 10%-20% fewer staff hours required due to higher labor efficiency and fewer time wasters in the stores
- An increase in on-shelf availability and sales by over 5%
- Improved customer experience
- Lower total costs along the supply chain
- Reinvigorated staff engagement with the business

Exhibit 3: A step-by-step guide to addressing store inefficiencies

1. Understand the status quo and collect and validate a long list of suggestions for improvements in stores
2. Prioritize the list in terms of an overall optimum, for example being careful when weighting issues with higher costs in particular departments, but lower costs across the whole business
3. Institutionalize collaboration across different teams and functions
4. Begin to implement the improvements and monitor: establish KPIs and clearly designate responsibility
5. Measure the progress of each improvement initiative

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We believe that retailers can unlock substantial cost savings by identifying and removing barriers to front-line efficiency created at a corporate level or by a lack of cross-silo collaboration. Impressive results can be delivered with this approach within a period of 6-12 months. Store staff time savings of 10%-20% can be realized and assigned to other activities, such as improving customer experience. On-shelf availability could increase more than 5%, significantly reducing the volume of lost sales. In addition, when store staff and customers are listened to and employees’ hassles are solved, there will also be a tangible uplift in employee satisfaction. Over time, this will drive further business improvements.
CASE STUDY 1

REDUCING THE TIME AND EFFORT SPENT ON REPLENISHMENT

THE CHALLENGE
A retailer analyzed the time and distance from the stockroom to shelves that needed frequent restocking. It found that staff were spending up to 25% of their time carrying out replenishment activities.

THE SOLUTION
The logistics team and store managers collaborated to find the best way of optimizing both the picking effort in the store room and the replenishment distances on the shop floor (Exhibit 4).

The business reorganized its warehouses by aligning the order of products to a typical store layout. To do so, it defined clusters of products located close to each other in stores and ensured they were placed in the same picking area in the warehouse.

THE OUTCOME
The results included a 20% drop in distances covered by staff during replenishment and almost a 10% decline in time spent on replenishment activities per week per store. Regularly tracking product clusters ensured new listings and seasonal changes in the range could be easily reflected.

Exhibit 4: Reducing distances traveled when replenishing stock

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
CASE STUDY 2

REducing Waiting Times At Tills

The Challenge

Most retailers have checkout systems with security measures to avoid misuse and theft. These measures can require frequent manager overrides and supervision, extending the time customers spend waiting at tills.

The Solution

We recommended listing all the checkout activities requiring a store manager, recording how often they occurred and how long they took to deal with. Till regulations issued by head office were then updated so only those really needed were kept. For example, some override alerts were removed and the head office guidelines for minimal values for change held at each checkout were revised.

The Outcome

As shown in Exhibit 5, by adjusting these regulations – while at the same time keeping the risk of misuse flat – we achieved 90% fewer checkout calls for store managers. At this retailer, this was equivalent to 5-10 hours of manager and cashier time per week and, importantly, shorter waiting times for customers of a similar amount.

Exhibit 5: Updating central regulations reduces checkout inefficiencies

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
CASE STUDY 3

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF OUT-OF-STOCKS

THE CHALLENGE

High product availability is a key driver of satisfied customers and prevents a loss of sales (Exhibit 6). The reasons for out-of-stocks can be many and varied. At one particular retailer, while 60% of out-of-stocks were caused by the stores themselves (for example, by problems with replenishment, manual order management, or shelf maintenance), 40% of all out-of-stocks had their origin in head office processes (Exhibit 7).

THE SOLUTION

Head office made adjustments to the product forecasting systems, optimized delivery frequencies, and delivered better tools for inventory management. In-store training complemented the improvements and allowed all employees with an influence on availability to role-play the most critical scenarios and to learn new tips and tricks to avoid out-of-stocks.

THE OUTCOME

On-shelf availability increased by several percentage points, especially during critical periods such as before national holidays or events. The improvements made to the automatic forecasting systems resulted in fewer manual interventions being required. Overall, the process for restocking and replenishing became much leaner.

Exhibit 6: How customers respond to out-of-stocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHARE OF TOTAL</th>
<th>Do without</th>
<th>Buy from competitor</th>
<th>Substitute (more expensive)</th>
<th>Substitute (similar price)</th>
<th>Substitute (less expensive)</th>
<th>Buy next time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHARE</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost sales</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis

Exhibit 7: Why do products go out of stock?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STORE ERRORS</th>
<th>60%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORPORATE ERRORS</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAREHOUSE ERRORS</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLIER ERRORS</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
USING DATA TO MAKE BETTER DECISIONS

THE CHALLENGE

For most retailers, using huge amounts of data to generate a host of reports is not a challenge, but getting the right set of useful insights can be. In many instances, KPIs and reports sit within silos. We’ve even seen cases where reports from two departments were thought to show the same KPI, but it turned out that each had been generated using different calculations. Siloed reporting does not reflect the impact of decisions on other departments – such as decisions taken in sales that affect logistics – and so the business is unable to drive improvements across silos. We saw one example, shown in Exhibit 8, where the modification of store planograms by category managers did not reflect in-store effort required to reorganize all the shelves.

THE SOLUTION

We tested a radical way to improve matters: shutting down all existing reports to start from scratch. The aim was report simplification and harmonization. In the case of the planogram changes, we introduced a KPI that illustrated to the category managers in head office the true cost of category changes in-store: 50% of planogram changes moved more than 50% of items, but included fewer than 10% new products.

THE OUTCOME

The result was a giant leap towards greater transparency in decisionmaking processes. For category managers, the KPI helped them to change their practices: very few listings or delistings caused a large portion of products to have their shelf positions changed, and any modifications that were needed were bundled together to limit inefficient modifications in the stores.

Exhibit 8: Identifying inefficient category modifications made over a three-month period

Note Each point = 1 planogram change
Source Oliver Wyman analysis
In clothing retail, the battle of the supply chains is underway. In response to consumer trends, products can now reach main street in record time and at bargain prices, all thanks to supply chains specifically designed to support a high-volume, more flexible model. In this article, we look at how retailers should react and how they can rethink their own supply chains to compete. With this type of supply chain becoming more relevant to other non-food sectors over time, there is much to be learned, regardless of whether you sell shirts, high heels, toys, or jewelry.

Over the past 30 years, the textile industry in Europe has experienced disruption from two types of new business models. In the 1980s, the fast-fashion business model first emerged. Then, five to 10 years later, aggressively priced fast-fashion discounters arrived and began driving a step change in customer expectations with their ability to undercut traditional clothing retailers by 50% or more (see Exhibit 1 and Case Studies 1 and 2).

As a consequence, numerous multilabel retailers operating a traditional two-season business have been forced out of the market, and many vertical players who have not yet adopted fast-fashion supply chain principles – at least on some of their products – are suffering.

Exhibit 1: A comparison of price points across fashion retailers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price in Euros</th>
<th>Manufacturer/Brand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69.90</td>
<td>Tommy Hilfiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.95</td>
<td>s.Oliver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>Zara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>H&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>Forever 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>Peacocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>Primark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
DIFFERENTIATED SUPPLY CHAIN LINKS

As discussed in Case Study 1, the supply chains in fast-fashion rely on being the most cost efficient, flexible, and timely for each specific product type. As such, the product range is broken down into clearly defined segments, such as evergreens, traffic generators, and image products (see Exhibit 2), and each segment’s supply chain needs are clearly defined.

EVERGREENS

These can be transported from Asia by boat in a cost-efficient manner and in predictable volumes. These products are not fashion driven so it is not worth paying for a fast and flexible supply chain.

TRAFFIC GENERATORS AND HEADLINE GRABBERS

These items often have concept-to-shelf times below 20 weeks. For such fast-tracked items, the final production steps often take place in Turkey or North Africa for European retailers, or Mexico for the US and Canada, and the goods are often transported by air. To ensure reliable manufacture, production capacities are frequently reserved in advance and pre-colored fabrics prepared up front. The final steps validate the item, fine-tune the fit, and so on.

Combining this fast-track approach with increased frequency of new collections ensures that fast-fashion retailers can manage the freshness of their assortment. This, in turn, increases consumer sales and results in improved price realization and lower markdowns. These benefits usually exceed the extra supply chain costs and, indeed, our experience shows that the cost of markdowns in a traditional multibrand retailer can be reduced by 25%-50% using a fast-track approach.

CASE STUDY 1

THE FAST-FASHION MODEL

Fast-fashion business models are all underpinned by a segmented value chain that carefully juggles cost efficiency, flexibility, and speed across product types. Their supply chain normally comprises three parts, as described in Exhibit 2. The most sophisticated go beyond this by putting in place a fourth process to capture missed trends. Once set in motion, this supply chain can deliver an item from concept to shelf in less than 10 weeks.

The supply chain is tightly managed by direct feedback mechanisms from the shop floor, known as “read and react.” By tracking a collection’s hot sellers and slow movers, the retailer can adapt to ensure precise make-to-demand production, which optimizes for – and outclasses - the traditional make-to-stock and make-to-forecast models.

Combining a fast-track approach with frequent new collections enables fast-fashion retailers to ensure that their range is always up to date. This increases sales velocity, and the higher stock turn allows them to sell at prices significantly lower than other fashion retailers, with the additional volume more than making up for higher supply chain costs.
The most sophisticated textile retailers go beyond this, putting in place an additional final step; a separate process that swings into action if a trend is missed. Once set in motion, this “chase” stream can produce an item from concept-to-shelf in less than 10 weeks.

This breakdown of the value chain into category roles is complemented by a direct feedback mechanism, “read and react.” Each day stores report back on the collection’s hot sellers and slow movers, thus enabling the product line to be constantly positioned for sell-out. This process results in an optimized make-to-demand production operation that outclasses traditional make-to-stock and make-to-forecast models in many regards. A number of catalog and multichannel retailers have already taken a cue from this approach and have introduced a form of “read and react” for their product ranges.

HOW TRADITIONAL MULTIBRAND RETAILERS CAN FIGHT BACK

When fast-fashion retailers and discounters first arrive, many multibrand retailers start by increasing investment in the shopping experience, both in terms of product mix and visual merchandising, as well as in complementary inserts such as coffee bars, DJs, and complementary beverages. The result is often unsatisfactory, as selling space is sacrificed for aspirational elements of experience that simply do not justify their cost.

Exhibit 2: Three categories in a differentiated supply chain for clothing retail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVERGREEN PRODUCTS</th>
<th>TRAFFIC GENERATORS</th>
<th>HEADLINE GRABBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply chain requirements</td>
<td>Supply chain requirements</td>
<td>Supply chain requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Cost efficiency</td>
<td>✓ Flexibility</td>
<td>✓ Reliability of processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Planning security</td>
<td>✓ Option for smaller order sizes</td>
<td>✓ Flexibility and speed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Supplier reliability</td>
<td>✓ Fast implementation</td>
<td>✓ Shortened process steps and faster handover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Dependable supplier basis</td>
<td>✓ Uses multiple suppliers</td>
<td>✓ Strategic, high-performance suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>✓ Uses long-term strategic suppliers</td>
<td>✓ Production in Asia and Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Production in Asia</td>
<td>✓ Ocean freight</td>
<td>✓ Production in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ocean freight</td>
<td>✓ Land and road transport</td>
<td>✓ Land and road transport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE FAST-FASHION DISCOUNT MODEL

The business model used by discounters such as Primark or Forever 21, is a modification of the proven fast-fashion formula. Compared to the standard formula, these fast-fashion discounters have a markedly lower gross margin (less than 40%), an even higher level of standardization in material purchasing and product development, and a supply chain that relies even more heavily on efficiency. Combined with extremely lean staffing and marketing cost structures, these factors generate moderate single-digit EBIT margins, meaning fast-fashion discounters can only cover their fixed costs with high sales volumes.

This strategy has been profitable. With the help of unbeatable prices, including fashionable T-shirts that sometimes sell for just €3, they have concocted a price level that established fast-fashion players and traditional multibrand retailers can only dream of. The point of such a price model is clear: it is all about acquiring market share and establishing superior value perception.

Fast-fashion discounters are already well established in the UK and Ireland, but in the rest of Europe, their impact has not yet been fully felt. Though Primark has almost 50 stores in Iberia and half that number in the Netherlands, it has just 15 scattered across Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany. Peacocks has a limited number of franchise outlets in Greece and a number of Eastern European countries. Forever 21, with just a dozen stores in mainland Europe at present, is still in the first stages of its planned European expansion.

A more sustainable response is to take on the fast-fashion players on their own turf. To do so, retailers need to answer a number of analytically challenging questions:

- For which parts of the product range does a fast-track model represent an economically sensible option?
- What is the maximum markdown for a garment? At what point is it more profitable to use a conventional supply chain solution than the more expensive fast-track model?
- How can previous decisions be subjected to constant review (on an SKU basis), taking into consideration the dynamic cost factors within the supply chain?

The answers to these questions require a metric-driven comparison of the additional costs of a fast-track supply chain with the increased amount of sales produced by it. Three sources of data are generally required to enable this:

1. Historic price-to-sales ratios per style
2. Average markdowns throughout the product-range cycle
3. Costs for the various purchasing or supply chain models

With this information in hand, the retailer can put in place a product-range management solution that increases a collection’s profitability, product line by product line. As Exhibit 3 shows in simplified form, the supply chain can be optimized on the basis of fact, without getting bogged down in a debate about the uselessness of fast supply chains for white T-shirts and black socks.

Of course, it is not just as simple as segmenting the products. Retailers will also need the skills to implement the required modification of the supply chain. This applies both to the precise management of production capacities at various locations, and to the design skills that are necessary for expanding its line of own-label products.

WHEN WILL YOU NEED TO ACT?

Clothing is not the only retail sector where changes to the supply chain are likely to play a critical role in the coming years. An increasing number of non-food segments already fine-tune product supply and range, in terms of both speed of delivery and the highest possible level of cost efficiency.
This is most obvious in footwear, accessories, and toys, where the share of trend-led products has been steadily climbing for many years. All these sectors are subject to decreasing fashion cycles.

So how ready are non-food retailers to take the next step in supply change management? To answer this, retailers should focus on the following four areas:

1. Examine the opportunities for differentiation along the value chain and the costs entailed, including those from near-sourcing
2. Develop a comprehensive plan to restructure the supply chain, including streamlining SKUs, improving automated processes, and optimizing long-term capacity planning and lead times
3. Identify the supplementary skills that will be required, including read-and-react systems and negotiating closer partnerships with suppliers in exchange for sales data
4. Make an honest assessment of whether or not the high degree of resolve necessary to implement the required changes exists within the organization

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Fast-fashion business models are already revolutionizing the clothing industry, and we suspect that other segments of non-food retail where fashion-led products are prevalent will be next. Retailers can get ahead of this trend by segmenting their own products and supply chains, and where the trade-offs make sense, moving to fast-fashion sourcing. While these changes can add complexity to the business, they will also create a significant competitive advantage that more than justifies the effort.
While e-commerce sales accounted for just 8% of retail sales in the US in 2013 and 2014, cross-channel or “web-impacted” retail contributes to more than half of total sales today, a tipping point in omnichannel retail.1

At its core, omnichannel retail is about a gradual but important shift in consumer behavior. Now, consumers increasingly expect to discover, search, buy, pick up, and return items seamlessly from various physical and digital access points.

Both established companies and start-ups have made significant investments in building omnichannel capabilities. For all players, omnichannel requires a dramatic and fundamental shift in mentality from cost-centric, largely hidden supply chains to front-and-center, customer-centric operations. As customers’ expectations are evolving, retailers are testing a series of initiatives, including:

• More access points: online, mobile, stores, drives, lockers, pick-up and drop-off points, parcel shops
• More delivery options: after-hours, week-end delivery, time slots
• Shorter lead times: pick-up within two hours, same-day delivery
• Flexible delivery points: for example, at train stations for commuters or at workplaces
• More in-store and “drive” pick-up services: reserve online (e.g., the Gap, Macy’s), self-collect, pick-up in drive, endless aisles
• Seamless experience across access points and channels

This paper presents a new way of thinking about the operational implications of omnichannel retail and two steps retailers should take to survive and win in the new world:

1. Consider four key plays – focus on the four “plays” that will drive customer-centric operations
2. Think and build agile – design your organization and infrastructure to be flexible, innovative, and accepting of change vs. running from it.

1 Source: Forrester Research
PART 1 | CONSIDER FOUR KEY PLAYS

While virtually every retail process is or will be impacted by omnichannel, we believe that there are four key strategic “plays” that are critical to support the transformation in the eyes of the consumer: dynamic network design and order fulfillment, existing asset utilization, last mile and delivery, and integration with vendors.

PLAY 1 | CREATE DYNAMIC NETWORK DESIGN AND ORDER FULFILLMENT

The proliferation of new services will force retailers to develop dynamic network design capabilities, perhaps by leveraging or combining their existing footprint of distribution centers, platforms, and stores with third-party options to fulfill orders faster.

Beyond traditional DCs, retailers are increasingly relying on a more diverse set of models to accommodate different combinations of online versus in-store range, CAPEX requirements, pick-pack-ship volumes, access points, and lead time.

PLAY 2 | UTILIZE EXISTING ASSETS BETTER

Physical stores come with high capital and human costs, putting retailers at a disadvantage against their leaner online competitors. However, stores could also become retailers’ most critical advantage in the race for offering fast and local services if they could be leveraged as platforms providing supply chain services, such as order fulfillment, pick-up and drop-off points, returns, ship-from-store, lockers, etc.

Exhibit 1: Dynamic network design and order fulfillment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
<th>USE CASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Store picking          | • Offering a broad range of SKUs within two hours with minimal investment | • Click-and-collect  
|                        |                                                    | • Ship-from-store      |
| Dark store             | • Higher picking productivity on a narrower range, for pick-up or delivery within two hours | • Click-and-collect  
|                        |                                                    | • Same-day home delivery |
| Fulfillment center     | • High picking productivity on a broad range of SKUs for next-day delivery  
|                        | • Can be dedicated to on-line or shared with bricks-and-mortar | • Home delivery |
| Drop-shipping          | • Expanding range to long-tail of SKUs not sold in store through partnerships with vendors and wholesalers | • Home delivery  
|                        |                                                    | • Endless aisles       |
| Fulfill from vendor’s DCs | • Very high volume SKUs allows to cut costs and inventory and accelerate delivery | • Home delivery |
With current systems, processes, and layout, in-store picking productivity for grocery products rarely exceeds 40 to 60 items picked per hour – compared with 180 to 300 in a fulfillment center or dark store. Yet, we believe retailers will close part of the productivity gap through advanced inventory management and fulfillment systems and technologies, material handling tools, training, and picking methodologies. This would provide them with a critical competitive advantage against online pure players.

**PLAY 3 | BUILD LAST MILE AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES**

Delivery costs and services are among the most critical factors in choosing where to shop online. This has turned the last mile into one of the most powerful ways to differentiate in the market.

Incumbent transportation carriers have for decades built hub-and-spoke infrastructure and fixed delivery waves to offer overnight or next-day delivery services for mid- to long-distance destinations. This model will increasingly become irrelevant for the last mile.

Online leaders such as Amazon and Google have invested more aggressively in last-mile innovation than retailers and are shaping the way suppliers and transportation companies redesign their operations. Reflecting on how this impacts their own business model, retailers will have to consider three options to innovate in this space:

- Build their own proprietary delivery capabilities where they have volume and density
- Leverage radically new solutions offered by start-ups such as Deliv’, Collect+, Instacart
- Push their traditional suppliers to innovate more and rethink delivery models

Exhibit 2: Last-mile delivery

- UberRUSH
- Deliv
- Postmates
- Peapod
- Google Express
- Instacart

- Collect+
- Amazon.co.uk
- Curbside

- Amazon.com
- ByBox
PLAY 4 | INTEGRATE WITH VENDORS

As part of Amazon’s Vendor Flex program, P&G allowed Amazon to set up fulfillment operations within its own warehouses to reduce transportation costs and speed up delivery. While vendor managed inventory and other collaborative projects have existed for decades, this partnership is among the first in the online space. Target’s public reaction to this partnership emphasized the importance and complexity of vendor-retailer partnerships in e-commerce operations.

Vendors are making considerable investments in direct-to-consumer capabilities and partnerships. Given the scale required to serve consumers, we believe that it will be in both vendors’ and retailers’ interest to better integrate and collaborate to achieve critical mass and serve clients. Areas of focus will include:

• End-to-end distribution approach, drop-shipping
• Integrated planning and forecasting, leveraging Big Data
• Real-time visibility on inventory and orders
• Real-time replenishment
• Differentiated packaging for online versus in-store

PART 2 | THINK AND BUILD AGILE

Traditionally, retailers have grown operations sequentially. Expansion plans are laid out and executed in a series of pre-planned steps over several months or even years. However, given rapidly evolving consumer tastes and technology, this approach comes at a cost. It is becoming more difficult to predict what the landscape will look like in two to three years, much less define and plan for what is essentially an unknowable end state.

Not only will consumer needs continue to evolve, but omnichannel will likely mean different things to consumers in various markets and sectors. Consumption patterns vary across geographies and sectors as it relates to access points and delivery services. For example, in grocery retail, click-and-collect accounts for over 90% of orders in France but has only started to take off in the US.

If the only constant is change, then building flexibility and evolution into the organization and infrastructure is paramount here. To be agile, retail operations will need to:

• Think of the end state as an evolving target and adopt a continuous improvement mindset
• Focus more on incremental steps and sprints rather than a sequential “marathon,” where it is better to make progress frequently and tangibly in weeks and months, not years
• Consider working and live proof of concepts that impact the customer as the primary measure of progress
• Plan for experimentation and failure, fail quickly and cheaply
• Place a high value on simplicity, speed, and nimbleness
• Constantly reflect on progress and be faster, simpler, and more efficient
New and innovative approaches to systems and technology are also necessary to underpin the agile organization. Omnichannel brings a radically different set of challenges and requirements that are incompatible with most legacy systems and technologies, such as:

- Visibility and single view of product, inventory, customer, and order data across channels and stakeholders
- Real-time decision making
- Orchestration of multiple stakeholders: vendors, 3PLs, transportation companies, ecommerce platform, ERP, etc.
- Technology-enabled breakthrough in productivity and services: picking technologies and automation, in-store kiosks, etc.

How can retailers evolve their systems to enable customer-centric operations? @WalmartLabs is showing one possible way with 15 acquisitions conducted since 2010 in areas such as online community, search and discovery, predictive intelligence, and also cloud-based services for e-commerce and operations. Others are re-thinking the role of IT and service operations to bring them from behind the scenes to the front lines.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The rapid growth of e-commerce is reshaping the retail ecosystem and the balance of power between consumer product brands, retailers, online players, wholesale distributors, and logistics groups. There is a fundamental shift in the way consumers shop, thereby increasing complexity for retailers. Retailers risk losing customers, cash flow, and control of key elements of their value chain.

To survive and win in this context, we believe retailers need to shift their operations from cost-centric to customer-centric, focus on the right “plays,” and become more agile and innovative to hit a constantly moving target.
Today, e-commerce matters in every retail market. In some – such as books, entertainment, and electronics – it has already brought massive upheaval, and traditional players have been driven out of business. In others – such as grocery and DIY – its impact has so far been limited, but this is set to change.

While e-commerce will affect all retailers, it will not affect them all equally. Modest differences in competitiveness and financial health will be amplified, and as weaker stores are forced to close, those that remain may actually gain volume. This disrupted, dynamic environment does not just present new threats for retailers; it also offers new opportunities.

THE THREAT
ALL SECTORS ARE VULNERABLE AND SOME ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN THEY SEEM

It’s no surprise that e-commerce has grown fastest where products are high value, highly comparable, and easy to send through the mail. Although perishable, bulky, or hard-to-deliver products are less suited to online shopping (see Exhibit 2 in the article “Beware Amazon and Google: Staying Ahead in Wholesale Distribution”), the bricks-and-mortar retailers who sell them still face a serious threat. In many cases, their economics are already on a knife edge: Earnings and demand growth are low, and there is too much selling space in the market. Even a modest loss in volume to online channels will prompt store closures, and some retailers will ultimately go out of business.
Because retail is characterized by high fixed costs and modest operating profits, small volume losses can quickly wipe out a retailer’s profitability, and sectors with thin margins are more sensitive than others. The vulnerability of the US grocery market is examined in our article Online Grocery: Where Can it Work and What is the Threat? Compared with a grocer, a typical DIY retailer makes slightly higher operating profits, but since they also have a higher contribution margin (in the region of 30–40%), a 10% loss of sales to online retailers would erase all operating profit. So this sector is highly sensitive to online disruption even though many of the products involved are not necessarily well suited to e-commerce.

On the other hand, sectors with healthier operating profits, such as health and beauty, glasses and eyewear, and jewelry, are more resilient. From an individual retailer’s point of view, this may be more important than the fact that these markets are easier to serve online.

Exhibit 1 illustrates these points using the example of the German retail market. High margin and easy-to-ship products are an obvious vulnerability, but this also highlights the risk to low-margin sectors, such as grocery and DIY, which have the lowest structural profitability and as such are the most sensitive to any volume loss, however small.

Overall, we think that although the growth of e-commerce will be uneven across sectors, it is likely to drive market consolidation almost everywhere.

Exhibit 1: Vulnerability of retail sectors in Germany to e-commerce

Source: Industry reports and Oliver Wyman analysis
THE OPPORTUNITY
WITHIN EACH SECTOR, DIFFERENT RETAILERS WILL FARE DIFFERENTLY

As well as variability across the retail industry as a whole, within any given retail sector – be it apparel, grocery, or home furnishings – not all retailers are equally vulnerable to e-commerce. Some businesses are better insulated from online competition than others, and those with higher operating profits are likely to prove more resilient. It is important to realize that the relationship between financial health and future prospects is much stronger within each sector (for example, grocery versus grocery) than between sectors (for example, grocery versus apparel).

This is because relatively small differences in profitability can mask big differences in the proportion of stores that are barely viable today – which can be very significant in cases where there is an across-the-board drop in sales. High-level comparisons of financial performance therefore tend to understate the differences in the prospects for individual retailers.

In the example shown in Exhibit 2, online retail has already captured 15% of the market, and sales losses are being compounded by a move from physical to digital products. We expect average store sales to decline by between 3% and 6% every year over the next three years. Across the industry, this is likely to prompt the closure of around 30% of stores, but as Exhibit 3 shows, this could play out very differently for the competitors in the same sector.

Exhibit 2: The correlation between store sales and profitability in a non-food sector

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Overall, Retailer A is slightly more profitable than Retailer B, but it has significantly fewer stores that are only just above breakeven today. As a result, it is better placed to cope with volume losses: Whereas around 20% of its stores are projected to become unprofitable, the figure for Retailer B is 45%. Without a major improvement in performance, many of these unprofitable stores will be forced to close.

In a disrupted market, a slight difference in profitability today translates into a huge difference in prospects for the future. Second-order effects will compound Retailer A’s advantage: Because the two retailers compete head-to-head in many locations, store closures by either one will significantly benefit the other. Over the medium term, closing significant numbers of stores hurts buying power and supply chain efficiency. Depending on the exact nature of a retailer’s fixed costs (some are fixed more firmly and over longer time frames than others), there may be a domino effect in which one round of store closures leads to another.

All of this will serve to Retailer A’s advantage to the point where, when the dust settles, the overall impact of e-commerce could actually be favorable: in a sector where around 20% of sales end up online, the other 80% become easier for the most successful bricks-and-mortar retailers to capture.

Exhibit 3: Compared to the competition, small profitability advantages can reduce the impact of online disruption

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
SURVIVING AND PROSPERING
STRATEGIES FOR INCUMBENTS

As discussed, most bricks-and-mortar retailers are highly sensitive to modest losses in volume. E-commerce can therefore have a big impact even without capturing a large share of the market, and the disruption this brings will amplify differences in competitiveness between incumbent retailers. The implications are clear: no retailer can afford to ignore e-commerce, and those who can develop even a small advantage now will be much better positioned to cope with the challenge it poses.

In almost all cases, developing a viable online channel of your own will be part of the answer. Even though it may mean cannibalizing your own store sales to some degree, consumers will switch to online sooner or later and it would be worse if competitors were to pick up this online volume. Furthermore, an established bricks-and-mortar retailer has existing advantages that an online-only upstart cannot easily match, such as a comprehensive logistics network. The article Changing the Rules: Viable Models for E-Commerce discusses the strategic challenges of building an online channel in more detail.

As far as the bricks-and-mortar business is concerned, there are three things retailers can do to maximize their chances of emerging as one of the winners.

1. THROW EVERYTHING YOU HAVE AT BUILDING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

The winner-takes-all nature of competition when volumes are declining makes this more important than ever. Higher stakes should provide the impetus to make even tougher decisions on cost or to redouble your efforts to manage retail levers such as vendor negotiations, assortment, pricing and promotions, and category management more tightly. Small differences will be amplified over time; get ahead now, and it’s likely that you will be able to stay ahead.
2. DEVELOP A PROACTIVE “WEAKEST STORES” STRATEGY

Even a modest drop in sales will make it hard for the weakest stores in the estate to survive. This makes it vital to identify these stores in advance and develop a better understanding of their true prospects. Some will be impossible to save in the face of declining volumes, while others will remain viable if you can improve their performance even slightly. If you can develop a thorough understanding of the local markets around each of the weaker stores in the estate, you can make significant gains by focusing marketing efforts and store investment on sites where you compete head-to-head with rivals facing the same struggle for survival.

3. GET TO WORK ON TRANSFORMING THE FIXED ASSET BASE

Part of the strategy to defend the business must be to squeeze fixed costs to maximize the proportion of stores that will remain viable in the face of small volume losses. However successful these efforts may be, the hard truth is that few retailers will be able to avoid closing at least some of their stores, with all the pain that rationalizing the store network brings. Divesting sites, trying to get out of rental contracts, and reorganizing the supply chain to preserve efficiency is never going to be easy – but, if left until profits start to decline, it gets even harder.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Putting these strategies into practice is a real challenge. They require placing the long-term health of the business ahead of short-term financial performance, even though results might already be weak. In addition, organizational change is always difficult for large, long-established retailers. There are significant obstacles to overcome, but developing a slight edge over traditional competitors is likely to make a big difference. Of course, realizing ambitious growth plans in the long run may require the business to actively participate in the macro market shift to online, which we explore in greater detail in our next article.
In a sector where 20% of sales end up online, the other 80% become easier for the most successful bricks-and-mortar retailer to capture.
In online retail, winning is everything. Fixed costs may be low, but fierce price competition means thin margins which require massive volumes to deliver a profit. With customers able to easily shop around online to find the best deals on the products they want, there's little value in being their second choice.

So who are the winners today and how can you ensure your business is one of the front-runners in the future? How satisfied are customers with what you and your competitors offer? And, in customers’ eyes, how do multichannel retailers compare with those who operate purely online?

This article shows how the Oliver Wyman Customer Perception Mapping tool can identify winners and losers and how a Customer Perception Map can be used to inform a winning customer proposition for the online business.

UNDERSTAND WHAT CUSTOMERS REALLY THINK

Simply asking customers how satisfied they are does not tell you why they shop where they do. In addition, because each customer is more familiar with some retailers than others, it does not allow meaningful comparisons between all competitors. To address this, we have developed a methodology called Customer Perception Mapping.
We ask thousands of customers to make direct, detailed comparisons between different retailers across dozens of shopping attributes. The survey is constructed in a way that allows us to match what consumers say about different retailers with their actual choices about where to shop — to generate fair measurements of how well each retailer is doing in customers’ eyes.

Customer Perception Mapping distills customer satisfaction into two fundamental, independent aspects: offer and value. Effectively, it summarizes the retail proposition down to “what customers get” and “what it costs them.” For any given retail market, these two measures can be presented in a single Customer Perception Map that shows how customers view each of the players in each market (see Exhibit 1).

Over the past decade, we’ve applied this approach across many different bricks-and-mortar retail markets in different geographies, and have found the results it generates to be a good leading indicator of financial performance.

**USE CUSTOMER PERCEPTION MAPPING TO CREATE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE**

The Customer Perception Maps shown in Exhibit 2 paint a high-level picture of online retail in Germany. They identify those who have a winning customer proposition and those who are vulnerable to losing market share. By looking more closely at the detailed customer responses from this dataset, we can suggest three common strategic learnings that apply across geographies.

1. Amazon does have areas where other retailers could gain a customer advantage
2. Move the battle to the shopping experience
3. Bricks-and-mortar category leaders must upgrade their online proposition

Exhibit 1: Interpreting a Customer Perception Map

Fair trade line indicates the relative importance of offer and value in driving overall customer satisfaction for a given retail sector.
Exhibit 2: Customer Perception Maps for the different retail sectors in Germany

**ELECTRONICS**
- Amazon
- Apple
- Otto
- Redcoon
- Media Markt
- eBay

**BABY AND CHILDREN**
- Amazon
- Baby-welt
- zalando
- Baby-Markt
- myToys
- Tausendkind
- windkla.de
- H&M
- eBay

**APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR**
- Amazon
- Peek & Cloppenburg
- Esprit
- Görtz
- Mirapodo
- Bonprix
- Neckermann
- JD
- H&M
- eBAY

**GENERAL RETAIL AND MARKETPLACES**
- Amazon
- Otto
- eBay

**GROCERY**
- Amazon
- EDEKA
- REWE
- Lebensmittel.de
- Rissmann
- Bringmaster.de
- myTime
- eBay

**HEALTH AND BEAUTY**
- Amazon
- Douglas
- Flohon
- Yves Rocher
- eBay

**FURNITURE AND HOME DECORATION**
- Amazon
- Otto
- Home24
- Butlers
- Flotho
- Tchibo Fashion
- Connox
- IKEA
- eBay

**PET FOOD**
- Amazon
- Fressnapf
- ZooRoyal.de
- Zooplus.de
- eBay

**DO-IT-YOURSELF**
- Amazon
- Hornbach
- BaumarktDirekt
- Hagebau
- Westfalia
- eBook
- eBay

**SHOPPING CLUBS**
- Amazon BuyVIP
- Zalando-Lounge
- Vente-privee
- BrandAlley
- Limango
- Westwing.de
- PoudreDirect.de

**BOOKS**
- Amazon
- Hugendubel
- Buch.de
- Thalia
- Thalia.de
- eBay

**MOBILE**
- Amazon
- Telekom
- O2
- Congolease
- Vodafone
- iPhone
- eBay

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
LESSON 1 | AMAZON DOES HAVE AREAS WHERE OTHER RETAILERS COULD GAIN A CUSTOMER ADVANTAGE

In every sector shown in Exhibit 2, Amazon scores highly out of the 12 sectors investigated, and it was the clear customer favorite in 10 categories. Apparel and shoes and pet food are the only exceptions: here, Amazon trails the category leader overall and ranks no higher than third in the market for either value or offer.

In addition, although Amazon’s proposition is strong overall, there are four specific areas where it displays some vulnerability, shown in Exhibit 3.

LESSON 2 | MOVE THE BATTLE TO THE SHOPPING EXPERIENCE

Online, location is irrelevant, price transparency is all but perfect, and retailers can offer a broad assortment of products. Such characteristics of a retail proposition might have been of marginal significance in the bricks-and-mortar world, but they now give the advantage to online players. Similarly, each of the three following areas plays a much stronger role in customer satisfaction with online shopping than with retail:

1. Ease of use
2. Product recommendations
3. Checkout experience

Clicking through an app or web page is not the same as browsing products on a shelf in front of you, and customers are often looking for more guidance. It means that winning in online retail is not all about offering lower prices or a broader assortment – you probably will not be able to. Instead, retailers – and particularly multichannel retailers – must leverage these other sources of competitive advantage, as explained in the article Changing the Rules: Viable Models for E-Commerce.

Exhibit 3: Four areas where other online retailers could win the customer battle against Amazon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRODUCT DISCOVERY AND SELECTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product specialists often seem to beat Amazon on certain dimensions: expert advice, product filters, and the usefulness of pictures and videos provided. This is particularly true in categories where shopping is more emotional or subjective – clothes and shoes, furniture and home decoration, baby and children, and, to a lesser degree, beauty and pet food. This might be an area in which Amazon’s broad scope turns out to be a disadvantage, and sectors where searching is complicated may be better served by a specialized online shop.</td>
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<tr>
<th>PURCHASE AND POST- PURCHASE EXPERIENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This tends to be one of Amazon’s strengths, as would be expected given its Prime service and strong focus on logistics excellence. Even so, it shows some weaknesses on ease of collection and returns, as well as on customer service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazon’s weakest area is the low number of promotions it runs, which reflects their decreased aggression around price and discounting. Amazon scores relatively poorly on this dimension across all sectors, even those where its rating for other aspects of value is high. There seems little doubt that customers have noticed this change, but it remains to be seen whether it will ultimately be enough to cause any significant damage.</td>
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<tr>
<th>RANGE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Range is generally Amazon’s greatest strength, but it is sometimes beaten by at least one competitor that offers a better range of premium products. The perceived gap is, admittedly, small – but as with product discovery and selection, a category killer’s focused, tailored proposition could create an advantage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, customers see traditional bricks-and-mortar category leaders trail as inferior to their newer online competitors. The specific gaps vary across sectors and across retailers but, in general, poor competitiveness falls into three categories:

1. Lack of scale. Typically affects product assortment, product reviews, and technology-enabled recommendations
2. Lack of commercial aggressiveness. Exhibited in the delivery charges, returns policy, and pricing
3. Where a company is behind the curve in the development of digital products such as product display, shop usability, and filter options

Traditional retailers need to upgrade their offer attractiveness quickly: they risk being squeezed out by sector leaders who have scale advantages that not only reduce costs, but also allow them to deliver superior offer quality. Scale advantages in online retail take many forms – compounding the winner-takes-all nature of the market:

- It becomes more economical to invest in a superior digital experience
- Big Data plays an essential role in supporting customers in product discovery and selection
- Network effects in product ratings, reviews, and recommendations come into play

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In terms of customers’ perceptions, it’s clear that, in Germany, Amazon has a big lead over almost all other retailers in almost all markets, and this is likely to be the case in many other countries as well. Their only obvious weakness is in situations where the purchase decision is particularly complex, purchase occasions where a tailored shopping experience and a more comprehensive high-end assortment can allow a specialist retailer to deliver a more attractive proposition. In fact, the importance of recommendations, ease of use, and service as competitive weapons is likely to drive increasing specialization in both pure online and multichannel retail over the next few years – perhaps offering some significant growth opportunities.

Beyond this, how customers view different online retailers has strong implications for established bricks-and-mortar players. Today, they are rated poorly compared to newer, pure e-commerce operators; to compete successfully online, they will need to raise their game significantly. And this means more than just competing more aggressively on the “traditional” retail levers of price and assortment – ease of use and the shopping experience also have an important influence on where online customers choose to shop.

Some of the traditional retailers’ weaknesses are the result of deliberate decisions not to invest: to protect margins and live with the competitiveness gap that results. This is understandably tempting from a short-term perspective – and indeed, in some cases it might be unaffordable to do anything else. But in the longer term, it may fatally undermine their ability to compete online.
Germany is the home market of discount giants Aldi and Lidl. Over many decades, they built the foundation for their international expansion. One format that has suffered greatly from their rise is the hypermarket. Walmart, after a decade of fighting to establish a beachhead, eventually pulled the plug on operations in Germany. For the past 20 years, Roland Neuwald has played a significant role in shaping the strategies of German hypermarkets in this challenging environment. We recently sat down with Roland to discuss his perspective on the development of the German discounters, and what traditional retailers elsewhere can do to prevent them from making further inroads.

You have been involved in German retailing for more than 30 years. What impact were the discounters having at the time you started out?

Back then – this was the 1980’s – the discount business was dominated by Aldi. Unlike today, discounters were not considered serious competition. Aldi meant one thing: low prices. Aldi stores were very plain. Just about every item was sold out of a cardboard box. The product range was very limited and consisted exclusively of private labels. The stores did not have a full range of fresh foods, just a small number of fruits and vegetables, and no fresh meat or fresh baked goods. Essentially, they sold staples. At that time, the stores were designed for customers with limited budgets. Shopping there was not fashionable.
When did you realize that the discounters posed a real competitive threat to large-scale retailers?

It was a gradual process. As time passed, it became more and more obvious that discounters were something more than bargain-basement operations. At the beginning of the 1990’s, people increasingly came to realize that not only was the product price low, but the product quality was also really good. To a large extent, Aldi products were just as good as brand-name products. This was a perception confirmed by renowned and respected independent organizations.

Lidl expanded at an ever faster rate. All at once, brand-name products were increasingly showing up on the shelves of discount stores. By the mid-1990’s the discounters began to launch non-food sales campaigns that struck a chord with many consumers. This served as a breakthrough to the broader middle class. At the same time, the stores offered high-quality items, like champagne, at low prices.

This represented the dawn of the smart shopper; the quality-conscious consumer who is proud of paying less for good quality. In a nutshell, you can say there is one thing that marks the difference between the 1980’s and now: at that time, if you shopped at Aldi or Lidl, it was because you had to; now, you choose to shop there, and if you do, you receive a pat on the back from neighbors and colleagues for getting a really good deal.

A further change is that discounters moved into small towns and rural areas during the 1990’s. Increasingly, they took over the role of the local suppliers. Initially, this shift hurt the small independent supermarkets. It has also had a growing impact on large-scale retailing. Today, 98% of all customers in Germany are no more than 10 minutes away from the nearest discounter.

What do you consider to be the major structural strengths of the business model used by successful discounters?

The product range is straightforward and is enhanced by non-food sales campaigns. This, in turn, is optimally coordinated with all processes, store design, and logistics. A discounter has about 1,000 square meters per store and sells a maximum of two to three products, including sale items, per square meter. Placement and processes are thoroughly standardized. Thanks to the restricted amount of selling space, you can easily expand this model and thus achieve economies of scale and synergies – both in terms of procurement and organization. The reduced complexity of the product range facilitates a high level of detail regarding customer and product orientation. Furthermore, it is easier to shop at discounters than at larger formats. As a result, they offer a certain amount of convenience.

“Aldi generates about €26 billion in sales with private labels in Germany alone.”
How big a business edge does the discounter business model offer?

In terms of personnel costs, discounters have a clear advantage. The difference between them and full-range grocery stores is certainly more than 5% in sales. Not only do they not offer services such as fresh-food counters staffed by store employees, but they also have an edge in purchasing price. I know that Aldi generates about €26 billion in sales with private labels in Germany alone. At Edeka, the figure is less than €8 billion. When you consider that Aldi’s volume covers fewer items, the purchasing edge is tremendous. Then there are the benefits produced by the international bundling of product procurement, economies of scale in logistics, store construction, and central functions. As a result, discounters can afford to sell products at margins 10 or more percentage points lower than the competition.

How are the discounters’ organizational structures special?

Aldi and Lidl have unbelievable cost discipline, and the business model is continuously refined. Every manager knows the discount business model inside out. During orientation programs that last from six to 12 months, top college graduates are initiated into the ways of the business model while working in stores – even if they intend to work in areas such as procurement or IT in their future careers.

The two discount leaders also have a long tradition of family-led management. In contrast to some of their competitors, this enables them to think long term, without having to deal with pressures exerted by shareholders or the capital markets. In food retailing, this can give them a real edge when entering new markets, especially when wrestling with start-up problems. In the UK, it took more than 10 years before Aldi became successful.

What defensive strategy would you recommend to established retailers in countries where discounters are just beginning to get their feet on the ground, or just starting to exert real pressure?

The first order of the day is to simply remain level-headed – even when it is really difficult to do so. Once discounters appear in a new market, the pressure on a company’s own business model automatically increases. Processes must be optimized and procedures scrutinized. Organizations that suddenly see their sales and market share eroding do not always act logically and correctly.

Here’s one example of what I’m talking about: why do companies lower the prices of several thousand food products when Aldi only sells one thousand items?
Full-range grocers should shy away from across-the-board price cuts. Instead, they should focus on creating a base product range of at least 500 discount items made up of food and consumer products, then sell these at the same price – and this is very important – of comparable quality to the discounters. Furthermore, these items should be very aggressively promoted at the POS and in advertising to strengthen the price perception.

I have learned over the years that though such steps may sound simple, often they are not fully implemented because full-range grocers have a really hard time accepting the resulting margins. Traditional retailers in Germany have at times failed to be uncompromising in carrying out this defensive strategy at an early stage. The approach has failed because of the hang-ups that traditional full-range grocers have about aggressively selling fast-moving items at low discount margins.

What sort of conditions must full-range grocers put into place to carry out this defensive strategy?

To carry out this defensive strategy requires much stricter cost discipline than many are used to: discounters do not spend one penny more than they have to. As part of a zero-based analysis, full-range grocers should systematically examine every cost item and in the process generate real cost transformation. Under certain conditions, it may be enough to simply reduce total costs by 1%, which will then enable all cost savings to be invested in the discount product range.

What can full-range grocers do to turn the tables and go on the offensive?

Full-range grocers must continue to set themselves apart from discounters – and do a better job of it – by increasingly focusing on their own strengths. These strengths range from product variety and excellent fresh-food departments, ones that offer service and special items, to store design. In regard to service, in particular, full-range retailers must take steps to ensure that customers can buy many items that are not sold by discounters. They must also ensure that this standard applies to in-house logistics and the checkout process. You have to remember that discounters are real pros when it comes to product availability and checkout processes.
Should full-range retailers consider the option of opening their own discount format?

If discounting was viewed as an additional channel like e-commerce, and not as a retail format, things would have already changed by now. As online retailing has grown rapidly, every retailer has begun to think about multichannel, omnichannel, or cross-channel strategies and, correspondingly, to develop ways to realize these approaches. The fact of the matter is this: when discounters enter a new market and begin to generate growth, all other market players will lose market share. For this reason, it makes sense for market leaders, the ones with the necessary financial strength at least, to think seriously about the option of creating their own discount format – and they should do so as early as possible. But you can’t pull this off while employing the business philosophy, organizational structure, and culture of a full-range retailer. The two models are simply too different. This means that the discount format must be independent. It must be managed separately from the full-range operation.

In countries where discounters are currently playing a minor role, the longer that the market leaders wait, the less chance they will have of retaining their market share once the discounters begin to grow. In the UK, Aldi and Lidl have a market share of just 10% right now. If this figure rises to 20% over the next 10 years, the brunt of this growth will be borne by leading companies, such as Tesco. The time to act is now.

Discounters have gained a very substantial market share in Germany. Will this happen in other countries?

It depends on the economic conditions. For one thing, discounters’ cost strengths are much more pronounced in developed markets: this is where the advantage they have in personnel costs has the greatest impact. This is why Aldi does business primarily in countries with comparable gross domestic products. In addition, discounters always profit when economic conditions or consumer confidence worsens because this makes the middle class less reluctant to shop in their stores. In their drive to gain market share, I think discounters will primarily focus on the developed markets of Europe and North America – and perhaps on Asia later.

One last question. If you could start your retailing career over again, which business model would you choose?

I am really satisfied with my decision to work in full-range retailing. Every business model has its own special features. And each must be constantly refined and modified to address new market developments. Young people should select the retail business model with which they can identify, and then make the best of it.
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